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ABSTRACT 
The thesis analyzes civil-military relations in European security institutions by 
analyzing the organization and institutional mechanisms to exercise democratic civilian 
control over the military elements adapted to or emerged as a need to conduct peace 
operations. The goal is to assess the importance of civil-military relations in planning and 
conducting peace operations.   
European security institutions have been involved in peace keeping operations in 
the Balkans for more then ten years. Their effectiveness is measured by the dramatic 
decrease of violence. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of troops decreased from 
60,000 in 1996, when NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed, to a 
planned 2,500 at the end of 2007. The number of military forces involved in providing 
security, a normal task for them, is even smaller.  
The thesis argues that one of the factors which influenced the improvement of the 
effectiveness of the peace-keeping forces in Balkans after NATO took over the mission 
in 1995 is that NATO and EU military forces received clear missions and comprehensive 
political guidance from their political decision-making bodies. Because civilian structures 
did not micro-manage the conduct of operations despite the complex environment in 
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The thesis studies civil-military relations in the European security institutions that 
are conducting Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in order to identify whether their 
effectiveness is influenced by the existence of permanent Integrated Military Structures 
(IMSs)1. It analyzes the IMSs in three different European security institutions: NATO, a 
military alliance having a well established and experienced multinational command 
structure; the European Union, a relatively new actor in conducting PSOs, which has 
started to develop a military command structure in order to better conduct peace 
operations; and the Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe, a regional 
security organization, having its own military command structure, designed to participate 
in peacekeeping missions. The civil-military relations inside these organizations 
determine the level of commitment to conduct PSOs and the quality of civil-military 
relations inside them influences their capability to cooperate among them. 
The realities in ongoing peace operations make the cooperation among 
participating institutions necessary in improving the effectiveness of the international 
community in limiting the armed conflict and bringing the conflict to a peaceful 
resolution. The commitment of European security institutions in the Balkans created a 
complex environment in which they had to cooperate horizontally (among their military 
structures), crossover (among their military and civilian structures) and vertically (inside 
each organization). Analysis of these types of cooperation, and the problems they face, 
could provide a solution to improving these relations in a multi-national and multi-
institutional environment in PSOs. 
                                                 
1 Integrated Military Structures – permanent multinational military command structures existing in 




Figure 1.   Generic civil-military relations in multi-institutional environment 
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Peace Support Operations involve tasks that armies have carried out for a long 
time. But peacekeeping was never so demanding as after 1990, when the bipolar security 
environment lost its equilibrium, leaving the world with only one global power and in 
which the perspective of conventional warfare became more distant than ever.  
The involvement of armed forces in peace operations made them transform their 
doctrine, their equipment and their mindsets. But, as Nicholas J. Lambert says, 
… in most operations however, the military will not be operating in 
isolation and other International Community members should not be 
discounted. There will be NGOs and PVOs (such as UNHCR, ICRC, 
OXFAM, WHO, etc.) who may well have been in theatre for a 
considerable time. The military may also find that they will be operating 
under or beside an internationally appointed civilian overlord who will 
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have been given some form of legal powers to perform his own tasks 
within the signed political agreement between the parties.2  
This fact changed the traditional understanding of civil-military relations because 
in these operations, the interference of what Lambert calls an “overlord”, the civilian 
empowered to exercise control over the military forces, sets not only the overall mission, 
but he/she sets the way in which the mission must be accomplished, becoming over-
involved in the micromanagement of the operation. This creates one of the most 
important challenges of the civil-military relations in peace operations.  
Additionally, most of the missions are undertaken by multi-national forces, very 
often with different doctrines, procedures and mindsets, making the overall 
accomplishment of the missions more difficult and demanding, both for commanders and 
for civilian leaders. 
The “relative decline of UN peacekeeping activity after 1994 reflected a loss of 
confidence following well-documented setbacks in Rwanda, the Balkans and Somalia”3 
and brought the international community to a new challenge. The UN started to be seen 
as unable to manage the military side of these operations, but the need for institutions 
able to take over did not decrease. Regional security institutions became relevant actors 
because “advantages of regional action are many. The willingness of a state to take part 
in a peace operation has a lot to do with its national interests and there is likely to be 
more importance attached to regional or sub-regional stability.”4 This development 
generated a new challenge, because mainly in Europe, appeared “regional blocs designed 
to police the ‘liberal peace,’”5 adding to the multi-national civil-military relations a new 
dimension: multi-institutionality. European security institutions went beyond this and, 
using the NATO model, created permanent command structures (called Integrated 
                                                 
2 Nicholas J. Lambert, “Measuring Success of the NATO Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-
2000,” European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 140, Issue 2, (2002), 23. 
3 Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham, “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping And The Globalization Of 
Security” International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.2, (Summer 2005), 142. 
4 The Challenges Report: Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 31st Century – Concluding Report 
1997-2002, (Elander Gotab, Stockholm, 2002), 53. 
5 Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham, “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping And The Globalization Of 
Security,” International Peacekeeping, (Summer 2005), 140. 
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Military Structures) and even permanent multi-national forces with varying degrees of 
readiness. These military structures are involved in planning, conducting and evaluating 
the way in which the forces are accomplishing their missions and tasks in PSOs.  
The thesis analyzes the challenges of multi-institutionality on the civil-military 
relations in Peace Support Operations, focusing on the civil-military relations in 
European security institutions conducting operations in the Balkans. The purpose is to 
identify whether the existence of permanent military structures, and implicitly, of 
democratic civil-military relations, is a factor in improving of these relations and whether 
it can increase the efficiency of peacekeeping forces in accomplishing their missions. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW. 
1. Prior Work Covering the Role of Institutions Role, Multi-Institutional 
Framework and Civil-Military Relations in Peace Operations 
“To analyze world politics in the 1990s is to discuss international institutions: the 
rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement 
those rules,”6 writes Keohane in his article, International Institutions: Can 
Interdependence Work?. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipton and Duncan Snidal wrote in 
their article The Rational Design of International Institutions that “[i]nternational 
institutions are central features of modern international relations. This is true of trade… 
and even national security, once the exclusive realm of pure state action.”7   
In the 1990s, the UN’s role as unique global actor in preserving peace has been 
challenged by an increasing number of security institutions, outside of the UN system, 
involved in solving the new problems that emerged in the post-Cold War environment. 
The UN proved to have limited tools to act in intra-state conflicts, its system of norms 
and values being strongly related to the Cold War peace- keeping doctrine that dealt 
mainly with inter-state conflicts. One of the first important challenges that the UN had to 
                                                 
6 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy, No. 
110 (1998), 82. 
7 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipton, Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International 
Institutions,” International Organizations, Vol. 55 No.5 (Autumn, 2001), 761. 
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face in the new security environment was the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia. The 
limited and unclear mandate given to United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina made the international community consider this mission a failure. In 
an interview published in Middle East Report, Mark Duffield, professor of Development, 
Democratization and Conflict in the Institute for Politics and International Studies at the 
University of Leeds, answering the question “[i]s it also the view of UNPROFOR people 
themselves? Are they being restrained externally?”, said that “[A] lot of officers feel this, 
yes. There have been a lot of problems between the past two senior commanders and UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali about the inability to enforce their mandate. … Being 
there and not doing anything is the worst.”8 
In their study called Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of 
Security, Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham propose a system that includes UN 
capabilities at the global level, but which would devolve the focal role in peace 
operations to sub-regional security systems.9  
All these studies, and not only these, emphasize the fact that in the post-Cold War 
peace operations, the UN alone can no longer be the peace provider. Therefore, in 
regions such as Europe, which “are further advanced than others with their political and 
security-related mechanisms, and have demonstrated active interest in addressing their 
problems,”10 the UN efforts should be complemented by those regional institutions. 
But the participation of different institutions creates a new problem. In order to be 
real actors in this field, these institutions should have military forces able to carry out 
these missions. According to former United Nations Secretary-General Dag 
Hammerskjold, “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.”11 
                                                 
8 Joe Stork, “Bosnia is the Classic Case of Using Humanitarian Aid as a Smokescreen to Hide Political 
failure,” Middle East Report, No 187/188 (Mar-Jun 1994), 20. 
9 Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham, “Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping And The Globalization of 
Security,” International Peacekeeping, (Summer 2005), figure 1, 143. 
10 The Challenges Report, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 31st Century – Concluding Report 
1997-2002, (Stockholm: Elander Gotab, 2002), 53. 
11 Quoted in Margaret Daly Hayes, Political-Military Relations within International Organizations, 
report of the symposium at the Inter-American Defense College, 28 September 1995, Fort McNair, 
Washington, D.C., 1995, 7. 
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The value added by the participation of regional security institutions in peace 
operations increased the civil-military relations problems that had hampered some of the 
UN peace operation deployments. As Karen Guttieri writes,  
Civil and military actors, both within various troop-
contributing states and in the multilateral arena, have 
waged fundamental contests over the determination of 
military mandates, specific military roles, training 
requirements, troop discipline, resource allocations, and 
multilateral command and control structures.12 
Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina furnished scholars with many examples of 
difficult and problematic relations between the civilian leaders and military commanders. 
Reed Coughlan, writing about the UN mission in Bosnia, emphasizes:  
… peacekeepers do not have a say in the definition of their 
mission. The United Nations, NATO and the international 
community laid out the scope of SFOR’s mission. They did 
that in the relative safety and comfort of bureaucratic 
offices in the west where the rule of law is assumed and 
where social tolerance and diversity are celebrated.13 
Mark A. Bucknam, former chief of the organizational policy branch within the Policy 
Division, under the director for strategic plans and policy (J-5) of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, 
wrote a study in 2003 about the difficult civil-military relations that existed between the 
UN civilian leaders, UNPROFOR commanders, NATO and US civilians and military 
representatives during the air campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “Holbrooke wanted more 
control over NATO bombing during his coercive diplomacy with the Serbs in September 
1995, but [Adm.] Smith resisted interference in operational matters from outside the 
chain of command. Holbrooke recognized the admiral’s responsibility for the lives of 
NATO airmen, but he interpreted Smith’s claim that NATO was running out of targets 
during the Deliberate Force bombing campaign,”14 writes Bucknam, in order to show the 
difficulties in putting together the NATO and US methods and procedures. On the other 
                                                 
12 Karen Guttieri, “Civil-Military Relations in Peacebuilding,” in Sicherheitspolitik und 
Friedensforschung 2, 2004:  81. 
13 Reed Coughlan, “Peacekeeping in Bosnia: Dilemmas and Contradictions in International 
Intervention Efforts,” in Globalization of Civil-Military Relation: Democratization, Reform, Security, 
George Cristian Maior, Larry Watts eds., (Bucharest: Enciclopedia Publishing House, 2002), 593 
14 Mark A. Bucknam. Responsibility of Command. How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced 
Airpower over Bosnia, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2003), 6. 
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hand, the UN commanders were “uncomfortable participating in the charade of UN 
impartiality while NATO conducted a campaign aimed solely at the Bosnian Serbs.”15 
The different understanding of missions, tasks, capabilities and needs made some 
military commanders take initiatives that would have been regarded as disobedience to 
orders in normal national circumstances. As an example, Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, 
the first UN commander in Bosnia, 
… recounted his July 1992 role in securing extra firepower for Canadian 
peacekeepers by working around the UN bureaucracy and dealing with his 
own government: “The UN never did authorize us to bring the missiles for 
the TOW [antitank weapon]. We were authorized to bring the vehicle [it 
was mounted on]. In the end, we cheated and brought the missiles anyway. 
Can you imagine telling soldiers to bring the weapon but not the 
ammunition? We were also told we could bring mortars, but not high-
explosive ammunition—only illuminating rounds to help us see at night. 
We ignored that order also.”16 
Additionally, a difference in interpretation of force protection between NATO and 
the UN made the NATO air campaign less effective than it could have been in another 
type of environment, based on joint planning and coordination. Dual key procedures17 
… worked as intended for air strikes; however, it was seriously 
dysfunctional for other no-fly zone operations. By giving UNPROFOR 
commanders veto control over air strikes, the dual key permitted Generals 
Rose and de Lapresle the power to manage the risks to their forces. UN 
army generals used the dual key to influence targeting decisions so as to 
prevail with their concept of proportionality, thus helping them to 
maintain Bosnian Serb consent for UNPROFOR’s presence.18 
During the UNPROFOR operation, another type of problems appeared: tense 
civil-military relations between the negotiators of the peace agreement and the 
                                                 
15 Mark A. Bucknam. Responsibility of Command. How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced 
Airpower over Bosnia, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2003), 278. 
16 Cited in Mark A. Bucknam. Responsibility of Command. How UN and NATO Commanders 
Influenced Airpower over Bosnia, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2003), 9. 
17 Dual key procedures were used by NATO and UN forces during the air campaign in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It meant that both NATO and UN commanders should have had to approve the air strikes 
against Serb military forces attacking Muslim civilian objectives in “safe zones”. 
18 Mark A. Bucknam, Responsibility of Command. How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced 
Airpower over Bosnia, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2003), 190 
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commanders of the forces on the ground, either the UN or the NATO Air Forces 
supporting them. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the assistant secretary of state for 
European and Canadian affairs in the US Department of State, in his memoirs, To End a 
War, only gave his opinion about controversies he had with Adm. Leighton Smith, the 
theater NATO commander. He mentions that “ [Adm.] Smith did not wish to let the 
bombing be ‘used’ by the negotiators, and would decide when to stop based on his own 
judgment.”19 The American official considered even that the Admiral ‘‘was edging into 
an area of political judgments that should have been reserved for civilian leaders.’’20 
All the difficulties in giving military forces a unitary framework led scholars and 
practitioners in peace operations to consider UNPROFOR as an unsuccessful operation. 
For example, Mark Duffield said that 
… [w]e have to find ways of getting past neutrality to identify and work 
with structures that can provide a platform for peace in these areas. There 
is a danger of just using humanitarian aid – Bosnia is the classic case of 
this – as a smoke screen to hide political failure.21 
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina improved when NATO, as a military 
alliance, with its established civil-military relations, experienced planning staffs, standard 
procedures and defined doctrine took over the peace operation.  
The controversial results of the operations in the Balkans led scholars to 
recommend a new approach to peace operations. In 2000, Nicholas J. Lambert, in his 
article, Measuring Success of the NATO Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-
2000, concludes, that 
… military will not be operating in isolation and other International 
Community members should not be discounted. There will be NGOs and 
PVOs (such as UNHCR, ICRC, OXFAM, WHO, etc.) who may well have 
been in theatre for a considerable time. The military may also find that 
they will be operating under or beside an internationally appointed civilian 
                                                 
19 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 146. 
20 Ibid. 118. 
21 Mark Duffield, Joe Stork, “Bosnia is the Classic Case of Using Humanitarian Aid as a Smokescreen 
to Hide Political failure,” Middle East Report, No 187/188 (Mar-Jun 1994) 23. 
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overlord who will have been given some form of legal powers to perform 
his own tasks within the signed political agreement between the parties.”22 
Heiko Borchert lists among the aspects that should be given attention when 
planning peace operations the following aspects: better coordination between civilian and 
military elements; the civilian side should have a central authority responsible for the 
civilian sector (like the military side’s unity of command principle); more integrated 
approach to planning, implementing and evaluating the mission; information sharing 
among civilian and military components; and as early as possible coordination of 
activities between military and civilian components of the mission.23 
After the experience and relative successes in the Balkans, other scholars, such as 
Walter Kemp, Ingo Peters, Leo G. Michel started to propose different ways to increase 
the efficiency of peace operation through creating a multi-institutional framework in 
which both militaries and civilians work together in order to better accomplish the 
missions. Ingo Peters launched the concept of “Interlocking Institutions.”24 Borchert and 
Maurer created scenarios for better cooperation between institutions involved in peace 
operations.25 
2. Questions and Argument of the Thesis 
Based on the literature review, the issue of civil-military relations in peace 
operations was studied by both civilian and military scholars and practitioners. The 
difficulties encountered by both civilian and military elements in this type of operation 
were also heavily debated and many solutions were recommended.  
The change in the approach to peace operations that followed the operations in the 
Balkans (IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina being the major ones, but also 
                                                 
22 Nicholas J. Lambert, “Measuring Success of the NATO Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-
2000,” European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 140, Issue 2, (16 July 2002), 23. 
23 Heiko Borchert, “Managing Peace-building More Professionally; Improving Institutional 
Cooperation,” in OSCE Yearbook 2000, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 3. 
24 Ingo Perters “The OSCE, NATO and EU within the “Network of Interlocking Security Institutions: 
Hierachization, Flexibility, Marginalization,” in OSCE Yearbook 2003, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). 
25 Borchert and Maurer, “Co-operation, Rivalry or Insignificance? Five Scenarios for Future Scenarios 
for the Future of Relations between the OSCE and EU,” in OSCE Yearbook 2003, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2000), 403. 
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operations conducted by European security institutions in the Republic of Macedonia or 
Albania) revealed that in addition to the recognized difficult civil-military relations in a 
multi-national environment, another factor that increased the potential controversies 
between the two components of the international intervention forces had been added: 
Inter-Institutionality. But, despite the idea that this would make the accomplishment of 
the missions more difficult, this factor made possible the hand-over of the NATO SFOR 
mission in Bosnia Herzegovina to the EU-led Operation EUFOR. As soon as this 
happened, the newspapers stopped calling the Balkans the most violent place in Europe. 
At a ceremony in Sarajevo on December 2, 2004, NATO Secretary General Jaap De 
Hoop Scheffer said: “today is truly a day for celebration – for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and also for the wider international community. People no longer live in fear, state 
institutions had been established and there was respect of human rights.”26 
Why did not this new factor hamper the mission? What is the main difference in 
the situation between the years 2004 and 1995, or even 1999?  
The argument of this thesis is that one important factor lies in how civilians and 
the military cooperated, how they were able to understand each other’s philosophies, 
doctrines and procedures. And these were possible because, in the meantime, the EU had 
created and developed, inside their structure, permanent military command and planning 
institutions, namely Integrated Military Structures, learning from NATO experience in 
this field. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The thesis will approach the topic through a case study method. First, the civil-
military relations in NATO, the EU and the Multinational Peace Force in Southeast 
Europe (MPFSEE) will be analyzed, comparing their politico-military structures 
according to their basic official documents and their evolution in time. Then, the civil-
military relations in UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR and EUFOR (in Bosnia-Herzegovina)  
 
 
                                                 
26 Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, speech at the SFOR handover ceremony, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041202a.htm, accessed February, 28, 2007.  
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will be analyzed in order to draw conclusions related to the evolution of inter-institutional 
civil-military relations and the effects of this evolution on the effectiveness of peace 
operations.  
The conclusions will be used to identify how the experience gained in Bosnia 
could be used to implement similar solutions to other theatres of operation with 
comparable environments (multi-national and multi-institutional) that could lead to 
analogous results. 
During the research, both primary and secondary sources will be used. In order to 
identify the structure and the civil-military relations in the security institutions, their 
founding documents will be analyzed, namely the North Atlantic Treaty, the decisions of 
the NATO Summits, European Constitutional Treaty, the EU Commission and EU 
parliamentary decisions, the MPFSEE Agreement. 
E.  THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter I introduced will introduce the subject by analyzing the existing literature 
on civil-military relations, peace operations and concepts such as mutually reinforcing 
institutions and interlocking institutions.  
Chapter II focuses on the permanent military command structures in NATO, the 
EU and MPFSEE in order to identify their evolution, the nature of civil-military relations 
in these organizations and the influence of restructuring (in NATO), creation and 
development (in the EU and MPFSEE) on the relations between the civilians and the 
military in these institutions. It will assess if these organizations have political structures 
to exercise civilian control over their military structure and if there are mechanisms that 
are designed to evaluate their military effectiveness and defense efficiency.  
After analyzing the civil-military relations in these three security institutions, 
Chapters III and IV focus on how the international community operated in a crisis area, 
namely Bosnia and Herzegovina. The initial involvement of UN forces led to escalation 
of the conflict rather then limiting it because the UN mission was unable to manage the 
complex environment created by the NATO involvement in supporting UN Operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). Neither the UN nor NATO were prepared at 
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that time to effectively cooperate in such a complex situation. When NATO and, latter, 
EU took over the mission, they used the experience gained during the UN involvement 
and were able to improve the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European 
security institutions therefore proved they were able to learn both from the experience 
they had in a loose cooperation with the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and apply this 
experience in a more complex environment when they took the lead of the missions in the 
Balkans. 
Chapter III analyzes the evolution of the UN Operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) in order to identify if the civil-military relations in 
UNPROFOR and the ones created by the cooperation between the UN and NATO 
influenced the results of that mission and the decision to transfer the responsibility of the 
peace efforts from an UN-led force to NATO. It assess if the civil-military relations 
created by the cooperation of these two security institutions affected the effectiveness of 
the UN operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the compatibility of the mind-sets of 
the civilians and military in UN and NATO.  
Chapter IV focuses on the NATO and, subsequently, EU, missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It analyzes the application of the civil-military relations of these 
organizations in a peacekeeping environment and the influence of their established 
institutionalized civil-military relations over the process of implementation and 
stabilization of the situation in the area.  The chapter analyzes the influence of the 
NATO’s strongly institutionalized civil-military relations on the effectiveness of the 
international commitment in a crisis area. It also assess if the EU military involvement in 
the Balkans positively influenced the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and if a multi-
institutional environment in peacekeeping is a viable solution for the international 
community.  
The conclusion summarizes the results of the research, highlighting the ways that 
could be followed in order to develop better civil-military relations inside security 
institutions, thereby increasing these organizations’ capabilities to plan and conduct 
peace operations. 
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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
INSTITUTIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The third wave of democratization27 started in 1974 and opened the discussions 
about the methods available to new democratically elected authorities for achieving 
appropriate civilian control of military forces. The objective control approach advocated 
by Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics 
of Civil-Military Relations, written in 1957, dominated these discussions. This approach 
is premised on a professional military loyal to the state rather than to any particular 
ideological position. Objective control involves a quid pro quo relationship between 
military and civilian leaders in which the military abstained from intervention in politics, 
and the politicians abstained from intervention in military operations. 
The Clausewitzian approach to the war and its actors, namely the primacy of 
policy and the consideration of the war as a “continuation of policy with other means”28, 
prevailed in the writings of Maurice Janowitz, Charles Moskos and Samuel E. Finer29. 
All these scholars studied civil-military relations from the state/national perspective, and 
even when the subject of civil-military relations in NATO was touched upon, they 
approached it from a national perspective. An example of this approach is the book 
Norstad – Cold War NATO Supreme Commander, Airman, Strategist, Diplomat, written 
by Robert S. Jordan, in which the problems created by the system of “double hatting” for 
Norstad as NATO SACUER and USEUCOM affected his military and political career. 
                                                 
27 Samuel P. Huntington, in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth-
Century, (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) stated that the third wave of 
democratization started in 1974, with the change of regime in Portugal. First wave of democratization is 
considered to take place in the nineteenth century and the second after WW II, between 1943 and 1962. 
28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michel Howard and Peter Paret eds. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989),  87. 
29 Here I refer to books published or edited by these authors on military and civil-military relations 
matters: Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 
1971) Charles Moskos (ed) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1999) and Samuel E. Finer, The Man on the Horseback (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2004). 
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This chapter will analyze the structure of three different security institutions: 
NATO, a military alliance having a well established and experienced multinational 
command structure; the European Union, a relatively new actor in the international 
security field that has started to develop a military command structure in order to be able 
to better conduct such operations; and the Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern 
Europe (MPFSEE), a regional security organization. In order to distinguish the 
similarities and differences of the military structures and the civil-military relations inside 
these organizations, this chapter will analyze the institutions (comparable with the 
legislative, executive, ministry of defense and military staffs as state-level institutions) 
created inside these organizations that determine the relations between the political 
decision-makers and the military personnel, trying to identify if and how they achieved a 
balance between democratic control of the military, military effectiveness and defense 
efficiency, as pillars of civil-military relations.30  
After 1990, scholars like Robert O. Keohane addressed the role and benefits of 
international institutions in the post-Cold War era. In his work International Institutions: 
Can Interdependence Work?, Keohane wrote that “to analyze world politics in the 1990s 
is to discuss international institutions: the rules that govern elements of world politics and 
the organizations that help implement those rules.”31  
In post-Cold War Europe, security institutions proliferated. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization reorganized and sought for a new role in the new security 
environment. The European Union launched its Common Foreign and Security Policy 
with its European Security and Defense Policy. Trying to stabilize the Balkans and to 
share and shift the burden of the military operations in that area with non-NATO 
countries, the US State Department started to sponsor different regional security 
institutions. But, as Keohane also emphasized, “to be effective in the twenty-first century, 
modern democracy requires international institutions. And to be consistent with 
                                                 
30 This approach was used also by the authors of the book Who Guards the Guardians and How. 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson eds., (Austin, University 
of Texas Press, 2006). 
31 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy, No. 
110 (Spring 1998), 82. 
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democratic values, these institutions must be accountable to domestic civil society.”32 
These security institutions became “central features of modern international relations. 
This is true of trade… and even national security, once the exclusive realm of pure state 
action.”33 They have earned more and more importance since the end of the Cold War to 
become the preferred tool to be employed in areas of conflict in Europe and beyond its 
borders. In order to accomplish the main goal for their creation, namely to be active in the 
new challenges for the military – the so called Operations Other that War, in Anglo-
Saxon terminology, or Peace Support Operations, in accordance with the UN vocabulary 
– they had to have, as the state does, permanent military command structures and forces. 
By having military structures, the multi-national security institutions started to become 
the scene for the application of the concept previously used mainly at the national level, 
civil-military relations.  
In the literature, the international security institutions are treated as vectors of 
democratization and globalization, their role in the creation of democratic civil-military 
relations in member or partner countries being emphasized. The role of NATO, 
Partnership for Peace and other institutions to – “seek explicitly to shape the military 
structures, missions and civil-military relations in the newer democracies”34 – is 
emphasized in the book Who Guards the Guardians and How; Democratic Civil-military 
Relations, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson in 2006.  
Very few works analyze the structure of civil-military relations in international 
security institutions and this chapter seeks to look into the mechanisms of these civil- 
military relations. 
 
                                                 
32 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy, No. 
110 (Spring 1998), 94. 
33 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipton, Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International 
Institutions,” International Organizations, Vol. 55 No.5 (Autumn, 2001), 761. 
34 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Introduction,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How; Democratic Civil 
Military Relations, Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2006), 4. 
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B.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NATO: TRADITION, EXPERIENCE 
AND ADAPTABILITY. 
As one of the many international security organizations created in response to the 
Cold War, NATO is the one that has been best able to respond to the new challenges. The 
rationale for its creation practically disappeared with the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the demise of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s. 
NATO became more responsive to the changes of the security environment due to 
its higher institutionalization, its staff and its experience in handling civil-military 
relations at the supra-state level. The extended experience in maintaining the balance 
between democratic civil-military relations and the effectiveness of the military in 
achieving their mission during the Cold War, namely NATO’s contribution to keeping 
the Cold War cold and to defend the Western democracies made NATO able to adapt in a 
relatively short time to the new security environment in a Europe no longer divided by 
the Cold War. 
Despite the fact that the Washington Treaty, did not provide NATO with a clear 
vision about the way in which the organization would be structured, it created the 
framework for necessary institutional elements.  
As Wallace Ties states, the creation of a “set of alliance-wide body that could 
peer into the economies and military establishments of the European members were 
facilitated by the permissive wording of Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty”35. In 
Article 9, the Washington Treaty specifies that “the parties hereby establish a Council, on 
which each of them [the allied nations] shall be represented, to consider matters 
concerning the implementation of this Treaty.”36  
By creating the Council and empowering it to implement the provisions of the 
treaty, the signatories gave to this body an institutional power to develop the policies that 
should have been then implemented in order to achieve the Treaty’s purpose. 
                                                 
35 Wallace J. Ties, Friendly Rivals – bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (New York: M. E. 
Sharp, Inc., 2003), 80 
36 The Washington Treaty, Article 9. 
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Another provision of Article 9 of the Washington Treaty gave the Council more 
powers: to “set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary.”37 This general provision 
gave the policy-makers from the Council the freedom to create an institutional structure 
that they considered necessary to implement the policy created at the highest level in the 
organization. The only guidance given by the Treaty was to “establish immediately a 
defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 
and 5”38.  
Through the powers given by the Treaty, “the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has 
effective political authority and powers of decision and consists of permanent 
representatives of all member countries.”39 In the Press Communiqué, issued at its first 
meeting in September 1949, the North Atlantic Council stated that “the Council is the 
principal body in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In accordance with the Treaty, 
the Council is charged with the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.”40 
Being the only body deriving its power directly from the Washington Treaty, the 
NAC is the highest level of organization in the Alliance and here the consultation 
between representatives of the member countries takes place and the most important 
decisions are made. At its creation, it consisted of the Foreign Ministers of member 
countries, but the need for a continuous process of consultation within the Alliance 
caused each member state to appoint a permanent representative and the meetings of this 
body became, over the time, a permanent routine inside NATO headquarters.  
The Defense Committee, the second institution specified in the Article 9 of the 
Treaty, had the task of recommending military measures needed to implement the Treaty 
provisions. One of the most important tasks given to the Defense Committee was to 
propose the military structure of the organization.  
                                                 
37 The Washington Treaty, Article 9. 
38 The Washington Treaty, Article 9. 
39 NATO, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 34. 
40 NATO, Final Communiqué of the first Session of the North Atlantic Council, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b490917a.htm (accessed November 20, 2006) 
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The structure proposed by the Defense Committee was the result of a long 
negotiation among the three main powers of the Alliance, namely France, the UK and the 
US. The initial proposal, made by the American officials in 1949, was to create four 
agencies that should be subordinate to the Defense Committee: a Military Advisory 
Council, a Military Advisory Council Steering and Executive Group, a North Atlantic 
Military Staff and a North Atlantic Military Supply Board. All these bodies were 
supposed to be mainly led by military and were intended to be the military part of the 
institution created by the Washington Treaty. This institutional structure proposed by the 
American officials was supposed to “exploit the asymmetry in staff resources between 
the United States and its allies.”41 As Wallace J. Thies states in the chapter regarding the 
creation of the institutional structure of NATO in his book Friendly Rivals – bargaining 
and Burden-shifting in NATO, despite the lack of efficiency of a complicated structure, 
the American officials impose it in order to keep the Europeans’ limited staff capabilities 
divided among multiple layers of decision and negotiation.  
Finally, the structure negotiated and provided in the treaty followed the American 
proposal, and the Final Communiqué announced a politico-military structure of the 
Alliance composed of the North Atlantic Council, Defense Committee, Military 
Committee and five Regional Planning Groups.  
The Defense Committee, composed normally from the member countries’ 
Defense Ministers, had the tasks to recommend to the NAC the implementation of the 
Treaty.  
The Military Committee has been considered from its creation the highest military 
authority in the Alliance. It was designed to function under the direct political authority 
of the North Atlantic Council and as an integral part of the decision-making process 
inside the Alliance. According to the Final Communiqué of the first Session of the North 
Atlantic Council, it was composed of the Chiefs of Defense of NATO members or their 
representatives. Its main responsibilities have been to “provide general policy guidance of 
a military nature to its Standing Group, advise the Defense Committee and other agencies 
                                                 
41 Wallace J. Ties, Friendly Rivals – bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (New York: M. E. 
Sharp, Inc., 2003), 80. 
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on military matters as appropriate and to recommend to the Defense Committee military 
measures for the unified defense of the North Atlantic area.”42 
The Standing Committee, composed of the military representatives of France, the 
UK and the US, was supposed to be a key military structure that would supervise the 
activity of Regional Planning Groups and act as the highest permanent military authority 
inside NATO. Despite the fact that only the three major powers were supposed to have 
representatives in this committee, the decision taken at Washington permitted that “a 
Party not represented thereon may appoint a special representative to provide permanent 
liaison with the Standing Group.”43 This decision made possible the creation of the 
centralized military authority on the skeleton of the Standing Group, a structure that later 
evolved into the NATO’s military staff. 
By creating the five Regional Planning Groups, the North Atlantic Council had 
given to the Alliance a military tool to plan the defense of Western Europe against the 
Soviet Union and its allies.  
This initial structure of NATO shows that the drafters of the Washington Treaty 
left a lot of leverage to the political decision-makers from the initial members to create an 
organization capable of planning the defense of the Western alliance. It had a layered 
structure, composed of political, politico-military and military institutions that had clear 
distinction of tasks.  
The overall political decision-making ability was given by the Treaty to the North 
Atlantic Council, which, according to the NATO Handbook, had had authority over all 
NATO bodies created during its existence. Because of its composition, namely the 
Foreign Ministers of the member countries, it has exercised civilian authority over the 
entire Alliance, setting the foundation for a democratic civil control over the military 
structures and forces that would be given to it. The fact that it was a non-permanent body 
was corrected at the Lisbon Summit, in February 1952, when the “the Council also took 
action to adapt the Treaty Organization to the needs arising from the development of its 
                                                 
42 NATO, Final Communiqué of the first Session of the North Atlantic Council, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b490917a.htm (accessed November 20, 2006). 
43 NATO, Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Lisbon, February 
1952, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm, (accessed November 20, 2006). 
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activities from the planning to the operational stage.”44 On this occasion, the structure of 
the North Atlantic Council was completed with a permanent institutional organization, 
composed of the representatives of the member countries. By creating such a structure, 
“NATO ministers also reorganized the civilian management of NATO, making the North 
Atlantic Council a permanent body, with member governments represented by senior 
officials and supporting delegations at NATO headquarters.”45 At this Summit, the 
ministers took another important step towards institutionalization of the Alliance by 
deciding to appoint a Secretary General of the Organization and giving this important 
position a working apparatus to accomplish the increasing duties of the civilian elements 
of NATO leadership.  
The Secretary General’s main roles are to act as a chairman of the NAC, Defense 
Committee (currently called Defense Planning Committee) and other committees as the 
structure evolved, to represent the Alliance in public as main spokesman on behalf of the 
member nations and is the senior executive officer of the NATO civilian staff 
(International Staff).46 
By creating the position of NATO Secretary General, and appointing a non-
American diplomat, NATO achieved two important effects. First, a balanced civil-
military structure was created, which had been un-balanced before by the nomination of a 
general to the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SHAPE), in the person of 
General Dwight Eisenhower. Second, the structure, un-balanced from the national point 
of view, was balanced because this position was given to a non-American diplomat, in 
the person of Lord Ismay, an experienced British diplomat with a brilliant military career 
during both World Wars.  
This decision completed the structure of NATO, transforming NATO 
headquarters into a highly institutionalized organization, balanced both from the national 
and civil-military component.  
                                                 
44 NATO, Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Lisbon, February 
1952, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm, (accessed November 20, 2006). 
45 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community – the Transatlantic 
bargain reconsidered (Latham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 2003), 25. 
46 NATO, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 74. 
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At these first Summits, the North Atlantic Council laid the foundation on which 
NATO developed into a military alliance that evolved during the Cold War and was able 
to adapt itself when the most important reason for its existence disappeared by 
dissolution of the Communist bloc.  
NATO has also civilian agencies that provide advice to political and military 
structure. These agencies are covering the a wide range of domains, such as supply and 
logistics (NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, The NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Agency), standardization (The NATO Standardization Organization, NATO 
Standardization Agency) civil emergency planning (Senior Civil Emergency Planning 
Committee, Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center) communication and 
information (NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency, NATO Headquarters 
Information Systems Service). All of these agencies advise the NATO civilian and 
military structure in their fields of expertise and respond to the requests made by the 
NAC. The International Staff has in its structure organizations that oversee and advice the 
entire military structure, such as Public Diplomacy Division, Division of Defense Policy 
and Planning, Division of Defense Investment, Office of the Financial Controller, Office 
of the Chairman of the Senior Resource Board, Office of the Chairman of the Budget 
Committees and International Board of Auditors. According to the NATO Handbook, of 
4200 people working at NATO Headquarters, 1200 are civilians working for the 
International Staff and the agencies subordinated to it. Compared to the number of people 
(military and civilians) working for the International Military Staff, which is around 
500,47 proves that the civilian dimension of NATO is considerable greater at this level, 
the level at which the major decisions are prepared and made. The International Staff 
areas of responsibility give civilian policy-makers the possibility of setting up a 
framework in which NATO as an alliance and NATO structures develop detailed military 
and political agendas. Ranging from providing policy guidance and political advice to all 
NATO committees and agencies, developing and implementing the defense policy, 
managing NATO’s operational and crises response capabilities, providing technical and 
policy advice on matters such as investments and assets development, to communicating 
                                                 
47 NATO, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 73. 
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with the public, the International Staff’s missions cover the entire spectrum from 
professional and political advice to management.  
The military organization of the Alliance is a multi-layered hierarchical structure, 
with the Military Committee at the top, with both strategic and operational headquarters.  
The Military Committee is the highest military authority in NATO and it is under 
the political authority of the North Atlantic Council. Upward on the chain of authority, it 
provides military advice to the NATO civilian political bodies and it implements 
downward the decisions taken by these bodies, being responsible for the conduct of the 
military activities in accordance with the political guidance. The Military Committee acts 
as an interface between the political decision makers – the North Atlantic Council – and 
executive structures, namely the NATO commanders at strategic, operational and tactical 
levels. 
This structure is currently balanced and respects one of the principles of 
democratic civil-military relations, having the institutions that are designed to exercise 
civilian control over the military, namely the North Atlantic Council, the highest 
institution designed to make the policies and strategies of the Alliance, along with the 
International Staff and the NATO Secretary General, as the civilian institutions that have 
executive powers to implement the politico-military decisions made by NAC, and the 
military organization to accomplish the mission received. The inherent democratic 
deficit48 of NATO is compensated for by the decision-making process in NAC, which is 
based on the consensus rule. According to this rule, the decisions are taken after 
consultations and negotiations among the member-states representatives, each member of 
the organization (member states) having equal voices. As a matter of fact, according to 
the NAC internal procedures, the decisions are not voted, but vetoed by the member 
states (this has not happen in the North Atlantic Council until now). Because of its 
disadvantages, such as the need for a long time for consultation and its democratic deficit, 
it was criticized by many scholars. In his article NATO Decision Making: Au Revoir 
Consesnsus Rule?, Leo Michel proposes a number of options to replace this rule, but they 
                                                 
48 Robert Dahl, in his work Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View is one 
of the scholars who consider that no international organizations are able to support direct democratic 
deliberation and decision. 
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threaten either the democratic substance of the Alliance or the overall authority of the 
civilian bodies, or could make NATO to loss of its substance as an alliance of democratic 
states. One of his proposals, called SACEUR Discretionary Rule, is a danger for the 
democratic civil control over the military is. Under this option,  
… the NAC would grant broad discretionary authority to the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), to prepare and update, as 
necessary, contingency operational plans for a broad range of potential 
NATO military missions. The SACEUR would keep the Secretary General 
and MC informed of such plans.49 
This rule could give a degree of effectiveness to the implementation of the 
decisions made by the allies, but endangers the democratic civilian control over military 
forces, one of the most important strengths of the Alliance, which was extensively used to 
influence the creation of this type of civil-military relations in the new members or 
partner countries from the third wave of democratization, from Portugal and Spain to the 
countries that aspire to become members in the twenty-first century, such as Macedonia, 
Croatia or Albania.  
The defense effectiveness of NATO was often measured by its role in keeping the 
Cold War cold, but it was questioned when the former enemy collapsed in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. After a number of years that made many scholars questioning the 
Alliance’s role in the new security environment, NATO proved its utility both as a 
political tool in the process of democratization in Europe and, in the late 1990s, as a 
viable option as a military tool to participate in peace-keeping or stability operations in 
Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia) and beyond its borders 
(Afghanistan and Iraq). 
In looking for military efficiency as the third pillar of democratic civil-military 
relation, NATO officials thought that it could by achieved by “promoting the 
development of capability packages and by establishing the Senior Resource Board that 
has the responsibility for overall resource management of NATO’s military resources.“50 
In order to accomplish these goals, NATO has developed a number of civilian 
                                                 
49 Leo G. Michel, NATO Decision making: Au Revoir Consensus Rule, Strategic Forum 202 (2003), 5. 
50 NATO Handbook, (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 60. 
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organizations responsible for assessing the efficient use of its resources. The most 
important is the institution of the Financial Controller, a position occupied by civilian 
specialists at different levels in NATO’s structure, from the International Staff to the 
military command structure. The Financial Controller is “charged with ensuring all 
aspects of execution of the budget conform to expenditure authorization”51. Also, an 
independent International Board of Auditors is appointed to assess the efficiency and 
effectiveness of NATO daily operations, this board being responsible for carrying out not 
only financial but also performance audits. Creating these internal structures, NATO 
created a system of “inter-institutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control 
via national governments.”52 
By these mechanisms, the all three pillars of democratic civilian military relations 
are covered: democratic civilian control, by the clear status as political bodies having 
the overall authority; effectiveness and efficiency of the military by having permanent 
structures designated to assess these parameters of the everyday operations in NATO. 
C.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
ADAPTATION, DEVELOPMENT, INNOVATION. 
Creation of a European Military Force has been an objective of European policy-
makers for more then fifty years. The European Defense Community, the first of the 
initiatives taken during the Cold War, had its roots in early 1950s, when Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany signed a treaty in Paris 
intended to create such a military structure. This initiative ended in 1954 due to the fact 
that the French Parliament did not promulgate the documents regarding this treaty, the 
European countries leaving the task of providing defense against Soviet threat to NATO. 
All other such initiatives taken during the Cold War, such as the creation of the Western 
European Union as the security and defense arm of the European Community, remained 
the second priority because of the effectiveness shown by NATO in preserving the 
security of the European States. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, a new European 
                                                 
51NATO Handbook, (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 63. 
52 Andrew Moravcsik, “Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis,” 
Government and Opposition, 39:2 (2004), 338. 
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initiative was born: the creation of the EUROCORPS, as the “foundations of a European 
army corps in which the other WEU members could participate.”53  
The year 1999 was decisive in creating the European Common Foreign Security 
Policy (CFSP). In May the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, giving to the Presidency of the 
European Union clear responsibility for the development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) and nominating the Secretary General of the European Council as 
the high representative for CFSP. In early June of the same year, the heads of state and 
governments  
confirmed the St. Malo Declaration and recognized that to pursue the  
CFSP, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. They commit 
themselves to further develop more effective European military 
capabilities.54 
In January 2001, the EU Council of Ministers established new institutions that 
would be responsible for pursuing the common security and defense policy: the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee and the Military Staff. With this 
decision, the European Union completed the structure that was responsible for developing 
the European military capabilities and would be leading the military actions of the Union, 
creating a network of relations that had to respect the principles of democratic civil-
military relations: civilian control, defense effectiveness and military efficiency. 
Democratic civilian control over the European military is supposed to be 
exercised by political institutions of the European Union. The European Council, 
composed of the Heads of states and governments, “lays down the principles and general 
guidelines for the CFSP, and adopts common strategies.”55 This provision is mentioned 
in the project of the European constitution, Article III-295, which states that “the 
European Council shall define the general guidance for the common foreign and security 
                                                 
53 EUROCORPS History, http://www.eurocorps.net/history/eurocorps_history/, accessed November 30 
2006. 
54 Julian Lindley-French, Katja Flückinger, A Chronology of European Security & Defence 1945-2005 
(Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), 204. 
55 Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP), 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm, accessed November 30, 2007. 
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policy, including matters with defense implications.”56 According to the Constitution, the 
Council should make the necessary decisions to employ European military forces in 
actions, such as the objectives, the scope, the means needed to accomplish the mission, 
the duration and the conditions for implementation of the required action.57 The decisions 
should be made by the council acting unanimously.58 
The European Commission, as a permanent institution of the EU, has a limited 
role in ESDP, being mainly responsible with the implementation of the budget (including 
the ESDP budget) and having the possibility of requesting a meeting of the Council in 
case of emergency or crisis. 
The Political and Security Committee “has a central role to play in the definition 
of and follow-up to the EU's response to a crisis. It is composed of national 
representatives at senior/ambassador level, located within the framework of Member 
States' Permanent Representations.”59 The draft European Constitution details the tasks 
that this civilian structure has regarding the issues of defense and security. According to 
Article III-309, it “monitors the international situation … and contributes to the definition 
of the policies by delivering opinions to the Council.”60 In the second paragraph of this 
article, the Political and Security Committee is entitled to exercise the political and 
strategic control over the missions undertaken by the European military forces.  
In this context of new institutional framework, the European Union has created 
the position of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 
High Representative 
shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in 
particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and 
implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on 
                                                 
56 Jens-Peter Bonde, The EU Constitution – the Reader Friendly Edition, Article III-295, 
http://www.EUABC.com. 
57 Ibid, Article III-297. 
58 Ibid, Article III-299. 
59 Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP), 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm, accessed November 30, 2007. 
60 Jens-Peter Bonde, The EU Constitution – The Reader Friendly Edition, Article III-309, paragraph 1, 
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behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting 
political dialogue with third countries.61 
Actually, by his/her tasks, the High Representative has a very similar task to the 
NATO Secretary General, and the European Community appointed a former NATO 
Secretary General to this position, namely Mr. Javier Solana. 
In order to implement the European defense and security policy, the European 
Council created an active and permanent military structure, structures that are integral 
part of the Council itself and they cover the entire spectrum of institutions needed to deal 
with the defense and security issues. They are as follows: 
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs 
of Defense, as the non-permanent body, but it exists as a permanent structure, each EU 
member having sent military representatives to act on behalf of the Chiefs of Defense 
inside the EU Council. The EUMC has the task of providing the Political and Security 
Committee with military advice and recommendations and it directs all military activities 
within the EU framework.  
The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is the specialized EU military 
structure that has the mission to provide military expertise in planning, conducting and 
assessing the EU-led military operations. It has early warning capabilities and is the 
organization that carries out situation assessment and strategic planning for European 
military forces, including force needs, capabilities and planning.  
Having all these decision making and planning capabilities in defense issues, the 
European Union continued the process of becoming an actor in the security area by 
creating military forces. The European Council decided in 2004, at the Military 
Capabilities Commitment Conference, to create military units capable of performing the 
tasks listed in the European Constitution, which mentions at Article I-41 that “the 
common security and defense policy shall… provide the Union with an operational 
capacity drawing on civil and military assets.”62 The tasks that these military units may 
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accomplish are so called Petersberg Tasks: disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue missions, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management and post-conflict stabilization. The 
Constitution states also that “these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, 
including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territory.”63 
The European Battlegroups, the concept launched at the European Military 
Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004,64 completes the military 
system of the European Union by giving to the civilian and politico-military decision-
making bodies created inside this institution the military arm in order to accomplish its 
ambition to become an important actor in the security and defense area. The “dramatic 
change from a decade ago is the number of men and women in uniform working for the 
Council.”65 
All these organizations are designed to provide the political bodies of the Union, 
namely the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament with the capacity to 
impose their decisions over the newly created military command structures and to the 
future European military forces, the EU Battlegroups. By creating this type of structure, 
the European policy makers had in mind the necessity to create a system of organizations 
in which the final decisions regarding defense and security be made at the political level, 
the military structures having the task of providing advice and expertise to the political 
bodies and to command military forces in accordance with the guidance coming from 
them. By going this way in structuring their military ambitions, the European Union 
provided the civilian institutions with the power to decide and limited the power of the 
military to the level of advice and military command according to the decisions made by 
policy-makers.  
The European Parliament (EP), as the legislative body of the European Union, 
was supposed to have limited oversight powers over defense and security issues. But, as 
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Ben Crum shows, the European Parliament struggled to accomplish a task that is a 
normal one in a national context: oversight of the military. From the beginning of the 
process of creation of the security dimension within the EU, the European Parliament 
wanted to have a “continuous dialogue with Council by al the Committees concerned 
with external relations. Thus Parliament seeks to establish a clear position for itself 
within the CFSP policy routines by using the High Representative as a go-between.”66 
According to this principle stated by the European Parliament, the High Representative 
Javier Solana attended on average four to five EP meeting per year, honoring this 
institution’s claims of oversight of the European security and defense policy. 
According to Ben Tonra, “CFSP is now functionally deeper, substantively 
broader, more institutionalized and more collective in scope (if not yet ‘common’) than 
either approach might reasonably have foreseen.” 67   
Having created all these institutions, ranging from the High Representative to the 
military forces and giving, even informally, an oversight possibility to the European 
Parliament, the European Union ensured a clear democratic control over its military 
forces, covering the first pillar of democratic civil-military relations. The capability of the 
political bodies to agree and endorse the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 
2003 was considered by the European bureaucrats another success, “outlining a 
comprehensive strategic framework which will surely inspire the formulation of any 
European foreign and security policy in the years to come.”68 
The other two pillars of democratic civil-military relations, namely effectiveness 
and efficiency of the security and defense apparatus have also been addressed by the 
European Union and the policy-makers in the member countries. 
In this respect, one of the major decisions made and stated in the Draft 
Constitution in Article I-41 is the creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA), 
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which has the missions to identify military capabilities objectives for the Member States, 
to harmonize the defense requirements, to adopt effective procurement methods, to 
coordinate national programs and to manage the cooperative projects and to support the 
research in the defense technology field. One of the measures taken by the two member 
states with the most advanced defense industry, France and Germany, was the decision to 
merge the German Daimler Chrysler Aerospace and French Aerospatiale Matra SA into a 
European consortium called European Aeronautic, Defense  and Space Company 
(EADS), creating the third largest company in this field after Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin.69 By this decision, the European governments intend to increase the efficiency of 
the security industry and to become a provider of defense equipment for the member 
states, among others. 
The effectiveness of the European military establishment is still to be proven. The 
involvement of the European Union in security matters was limited mainly because of the 
short history of the initiative. However, the European Union is currently conducting a 
series of operations in accordance with the provisions of the Draft European Constitution 
and the decisions made by European Commission, such as: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian 
Territories (EU BAM Rafah), European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (EUSEC DR Congo), AMIS EU Supporting Action in Darfur, EUFOR RD 
Congo, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia.70 All these current operation are 
constantly assessed in order to identify their effectiveness and efficiency.  
The EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(CONCORDIA), successfully concluded in December 2003, was an important step in the 
creation of the European military structure and democratic civil-military relation because, 
despite the fact that at that moment EUFOR was at its very beginning, it showed the 
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capability of a European military to conduct such an operation and proved the willingness 
of both EU and NATO to improve cooperation in the security field.  
Nicole Gnesotto considers that for these operations, 
… not only the deadlines met (the ESDP had been declared operational at 
Laeken in 2002) but the mission were crowned in success. In the Balkans 
and Africa, Europe demonstrated, through these modest in scope but 
clearly necessary operations, that the ESDP could make a real contribution 
to the stabilization of crisis or the prevention of humanitarian disasters.”71 
As Caroline R. Earle argued, 
The EU gauged Concordia to be a success, noting the relatively secure 
environment in Macedonia and emphasizing that the types of security 
issues now requiring attention, such as human trafficking and organized 
crime, could better be tackled by police. Others expressed doubt that 
Concordia had achieved its goals and argued for at least a substantial 
overlap with deployment of Proxima. The International Crisis Group 
emphasized the precariousness of the security situation, compounded by 
lax implementation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement and the delicate ethnic 
balance.
 
Ethnic Albanians also expressed concerns, fearing potential 
instability caused by the departure of Concordia. This view was not shared 
by the EU and the Macedonian government.72 
By creating this structure, European policy-makers wanted to  
… promote the Union as a global political player, capable of utilizing all 
the resources available – economic, commercial, humanitarian, diplomatic 
and, of course military – to act in a coherent and above all effective 
manner over the whole of its international environment. Therefore it was 
necessary to start by developing what did not yet existed: a minimum of 
instrument and capabilities, both civilian and military, which were 
essential if the Union was to have any international credibility.”73 
Despite the fact that the effectiveness and efficiency of the European military 
forces is yet to be proven, the conclusion regarding the capability to create a democratic 
system of civil-military relations within the European Security and Defense Policy as a 
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military establishment could be assessed as encouraging because the institutions 
established in accordance with the Draft Constitution and the treaties signed by member 
states crate a democratic framework for development. The democratic deficit of the 
European Union as a political construction is highly debated by scholars. It applies to the 
civil-military system too. But European scholars argue that applying this concept to the 
European Union is misplaced. As Andrew Moravcsik argues,  
The constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via 
national governments, and the increasing powers of the European 
Parliament are sufficient to assure that the EU policy-making is, in nearly 
all cases, clean, transparent, effective, and politically responsive to the 
demands of European citizens.”74  
Also, Jan-Erik Lane argues that “it is true that the EU is in many ways a new form 
of political system. Thus it is characterized as ‘multi-level governance’ instead of as a 
‘state’ or a compact political system. In the theory of multi-level governance this distance 
between citizens and the Union elites is explicitly recognized.75 
As it is mentioned in an article published by EIU ViewsWire in 2003,  
CFSP thus approaches puberty after a difficult childhood with little sign 
that its parents have overly high ambitions for its future. … Overall, the 
CFSP has survived a baptism of fire and taken its first steps in a difficult 
environment. Its adolescent years will be decisive in determining whether 
it becomes a healthy adult.76 
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN REGIONAL SECURITY 
INSTITUTIONS: INFLUENCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Balkans became the first hot spot on the 
European map. The separation of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslav Republic in 
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early 1990s opened the Pandora’s Box of Western Balkans and led to the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and, in the late 1990s, to the Kosovo War. 
In order to try to improve the security environment in the area and to avoid the 
spread of the conflict, at the initiative of the US State Department, different security 
arrangements and institutions, such as The Charter of the South-eastern Europe 
Cooperation Process (SEECP) on Good- Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and 
Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, 
were created. The Stability Pact is a  
… political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on 
international co-operation to develop a shared strategy for stability and 
growth in southeastern Europe among more than 40 countries, 
organizations and regional groupings. The Stability Pact is not, therefore, 
a new international organization nor does it have any independent 
financial resources and implementing structures.”77  
As Srdjan Vucetic wrote, it 
was constructed as a contractual link that guides all Balkan states into the 
European mainstream, particularly the EU. As such, the Stability Pact was 
welcomed as a historical turning point and an important step towards a 
fully democratic and united Europe. In the words of analysts and 
practitioners, the SP came as a much-awaited ‘entry strategy’; an attempt 
to ‘Europeanize’ and ‘de-Balkanize’ the Balkans, to the point where, 
according to the inaugurating speech by Finnish President Ahtisaari, “war 
becomes unthinkable.”78 
As part of the Stability Pact, so called Multi-National Peace Force in South 
Eastern Europe/South East European Brigade (MPFSEE/SEEBRIG) was created in 
September 1998 upon the signatures of seven countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, 
Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. In the preamble of this document, it is stated that 
Cognizant of the fact that politico-military co-operation has become a key 
element in strengthening the European capabilities in the fields of security 
and defense, believing that co-operation and dialogue among the countries 
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of the region of South-Eastern Europe must be further developed, wishing 
to contribute to the enhancement of interoperability, considering their 
commitment to contribute to regional security and stability, and to foster 
good neighborly relations among the countries in South-Eastern Europe in 
the context of the Southeastern Europe Defense  Ministerial (SEDM) 
process, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and in the spirit of 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), have agreed as follows:…”79,  
proving that the main important purpose of this regional security institution was the fact 
that the signatories wanted to enhance their inter-operability, accepting the framework 
created by the Euro-Atlantic security institutions, namely Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council and Partnership for Peace, institutions created under the NATO “umbrella”, that 
have one of their goal to influence the development of democratic civil-military relations 
in the states that were part of these arrangements.  
The Agreement establishes clearly, in Article IV, the structure of the security 
institution and the relation between the political bodies and the military structures. The 
overall decision making authority is given to the ministerial meetings, which can be at the 
level of Defense or Foreign Affairs ministers. The Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meetings 
are supposed to  
focus on political subjects and political aspects of military operations such 
as, new membership, participation in the Force, involvement in peace 
initiatives and/or peace support operations, contingencies, relations with 
international organizations, revision and amendment of this Agreement 
and related documents and overall political guidance.”80 
By the provision of this article, the Agreement gives the highest authority to a 
non-permanent political structure, which was entitled to make the most important 
decision regarding the development and evolution of the institution.  
Defense Ministerial meetings are organized in order to analyze the military 
subjects and to make decisions/recommendations regarding military matters, such as 
participation in operations, guidelines for the employment of the Force, and approval of 
planning documents produced by the members of the brigade. 
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The highest permanent politico-military structure of this institution is the Politico-
Military Steering Committee (PMSC) as the joint executive body for oversight and 
providing policy guidance for the day-by-day activities. The PMSC was designed to carry 
out a multitude of supporting tasks for the military structure, ranging from planning and 
budgeting to public information policy, and to provide to the political authorities 
recommendations regarding military issues, such as possible deployments, restructuring 
the force, revision of the Agreement and others. 
Also, the Politico-Military Steering Committee has the authority to approve 
doctrinal and planning documents written by the military headquarters and to oversee the 
performance, funding, manning and support of the military element, including approval 
of the Force HQ Budget. 
The permanent military element is composed of a multinational headquarters, a 
brigade level nucleus staff with a NATO standard organization (G1 personnel, G2 
Intelligence, G3 Operations, G4 Logistics, G5 CIMIC and Public Information, G6 
Communications and G7 Engineering).  The sub-units (battalions and companies) are not 
under the authority of this institution, but all the elements have the right to visit and 
assess their training and capabilities. According to the Agreement, “MPFSEE will be a 
‘ON-CALL’ Land Force, supported by elements from other services, as and if 
necessary.”81 
The structure of this regional security institution is strongly influenced by the 
NATO structure. It has non-permanent political bodies that have the overall authority, 
namely the Ministerial Meetings (Foreign Affairs or Defense Ministers), which give 
guidance to the subordinate structures. The Politico-Military Steering Committee 
(PMSC), the permanent component of the civilian structure, has both missions to direct 
the activity of the military components by making decisions related to the day-by-day 
activities and to make policy recommendations to the higher authorities for decision. By 
this structure, both the democratic civilian control and civilian oversight are achieved. 
PMSC has also tasks related to the assessment of military effectiveness, by approving the 
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military plans and other documents and by receiving and analyzing the annual report that 
is issued by the Brigade Commander.82 The effectiveness and efficiency of the military 
element are also measured by financial reports issued by the Commander. The 
Agreement also provides recommendations regarding the financial audit, which is also 
the prerogative of the Politico-Military Steering Committee. 
Despite these mechanisms to measure the efficiency of such an organization and 
the fact that the main goal of such an institution was to “improve regional security and 
stability, and to foster good neighborly relations among the countries in South-Eastern 
Europe”83, there were voices that questioned the real effectiveness of MPFSEE, stating 
that such an institution should be an active actor in the security field by being deployed 
for a real stability operation. After being  
declared by the Chairman of the PMSC operationally ready for UN, 
OSCE, EU and NATO led PSO; the initial SEEBRIG Force offer was 
forwarded to SHAPE (NATO) in November 2002. In April 2003, PMSC 
declared SEEBRIG ready to participate in a Peace Support Operation 
under NATO Command.”84 
MPFSEE was evaluated and certificated by Joint Force HQ Naples (a NATO Command) 
as “capable of making a meaningful and valuable contribution to NATO-led Peace 
Support Operations albeit there are a number of limitations that would need to be taken 
into account at the time.”85 
After this report, MPFSEE was deployed under NATO authority in Afghanistan 
as KMNB IX (Kabul Multinational Brigade), under ISAF Command, from 06 February 
2006 to 06 August 2006, achieving an important goal and starting to prove its 
capabilities. By this deployment into a theatre of operation, this regional institution again 
showed that this type of security arrangements could be an effective tool to improve 
regional security, to be a vector of democratic civil-military relations and an opportunity 
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for new democracies to learn from countries with traditions in this domain, by bringing to 
the same table diplomats and military personnel from different countries from a hot spot 
in Europe. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The importance of the international security institutions in the current security 
environment is obvious. Only looking to the evolution of the situation in the Western 
Balkans from the moment when NATO, with its experienced command and control 
system and, implicitly, institutionalized civil-military relations, became involved clearly 
shows that their effectiveness in solving security problems is far greater then the United 
Nations, an institution that at the moment of involvement in this area, had neither 
permanent command and control nor a system of civil-military relations and based its 
actions on ad-hoc arrangements.   
The question is why did these organizations become so important and more 
effective than other forms of international organizations? Their secret is their 
organization. Despite the fact that scholars consider that “major institutions are organized 
in radically different ways,”86 the security institutions analyzed in this chapter present 
many similarities in their structures and the same characteristics of their civil-military 
relations. They have an overall political authority, permanent or non-permanent, which 
creates policies, makes the most important decisions and provides guidelines to the 
permanent structures of the respective institutions. They are either councils, which meet 
regularly, (the North Atlantic Council in NATO or European Council in EU) or 
Ministerial Meetings (in MPFSEE). These civilian political structures exercise the overall 
authority and respond to the first pillar of the democratic civil-military relations, namely 
civilian political control. The Clausewitzian concept saying that “if war is part of policy, 
policy will determine its character,” applies to these organizations that showed their use 




military, written for the national level of analysis, applies to the modern multi-national 
security institutions, in which the “the authority of the military groups is normally limited 
to the military matters.”87 
All of them also present a degree of democratic deficit, what Heiner Hänggi calls 
“the double democratic deficit”88: first, the citizens of the member states do not have a 
direct influence on the decisions made by the policy-makers in these institutions, so the 
function of public oversight is not accomplished by any institution or organization, and 
second, the parliamentary oversight is not exercised by national parliaments. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the security institution created to 
defend the West against the Soviet threat in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
created the precedent in organizing such an institution. Conceived in the United States, 
the NATO structure was supposed to provide not only the Western democracies with 
defense and security, but to influence the creation of democratic structures and 
institutions in the member countries, most of whom were either conquered by Nazi 
Germany or were part of the Axis alliance – in both cases the member states needed 
models to develop democratic relations between the political and military elements of 
their stateness. By the creation of such a complicated political and military structure, the 
American officials “required to submerge the rival nationalisms within the larger cause 
that would channel the European energies into healthy rather than destructive outlets.”89 
In order to achieve these goals, the American officials looked to the organization of the 
American military and their subordination to the national political institutions, applying 
this structure to the new multinational organization. 
The European Union started the process of becoming an actor in the security 
domain very early, immediately after NATO, but the development of the European 
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military was stopped by the “French National Assemble [which] adjourns the discussion 
of the European Defense Community treaty delayed it sine die … and the EDC is 
dead.”90  
In the late 1990s, the European Union again started the process of creation of 
European military organization, by creating its second pillar.91 Because of the great 
overlapping of membership and the fact that the only available model that proved its 
effectiveness was NATO, the EU CFSP structure is very similar to the NATO multi-
layered politico-military organization. By nominating Mr. Javier Solana, a former NATO 
Secretary General, as the EU High Representative for CFSP/ESDP, the reasoning to 
create a similar structure had new incentives. Mr. Solana knew very well that NATO had 
proven its effectiveness during a history of more than fifty years both in a confrontational 
environment during the Cold War and in a cooperative one after 1990. 
The regional security institutions created in Europe, such as MPFSEE/SEEBRIG, 
had the same incentives to create organizations that responded to the requirements of 
democratic civil-military relations. The fact that in their membership are NATO members 
(in the case of MPFSEE, Italy, Greece and Turkey), which brought the experience and 
diplomatic expertise, making the structure of these organizations copy the NATO 
structure, adapted to a regional level of membership. These organizations, mainly those 
that were created in the Balkans, had another important purpose that copied one of the 
NATO goals: to increase the incentives for cooperation, to focus the member states’ 
energies on interoperability and cooperation and to increase the level of regional 
confidence. 
By copying the NATO model of organization, which mirrored in some degree the 
organization of the military at the national level in the United States, it could be 
concluded that the security institutions analyzed in this paper are copying the model of  
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national democratic civil-military relations, based on the three pillar system: democratic 
civilian control, military effectiveness and defense  efficiency. Also, as the Heiner 
Hänggi argues,  
with decisions on the use of force increasingly being made by 
international institutions, even established democracies, where the 
democratic control of armed forces is usually taken for granted, are 
struggling to adapt established national mechanisms of accountability to 
new situations. Since the early 1990s, the deployment and use of national 
military forces under the auspices of international institutions has 
repeatedly provoked heated debates in a number of troop-deploying states 
such as the US, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands – with each of 
these cases reflecting deficiencies, but also offering new prospects of 
enhancing democratic accountability for these international 
engagements.”92 
And identical to the national level, they achieve the “balance between democratic 
civilian control and military effectiveness.”93 The third pillar, namely the defense 
efficiency, is difficult to assess, a situation that is identical at national level. 
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III. UNITED NATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The end of any war creates conditions for institutional developments in order to 
maintain the peace. In the twentieth century, this was demonstrated by the international 
institutions devoted to maintaining the peace proliferated immediately after the end of the 
major confrontations. The League of Nations developed after the First World War and its 
purpose was to “prevent another war and insure international collaboration. … The 
failure of the League of Nations, culminating with the Second World War, did not 
diminish the enthusiasm of the world community for seeking institutional safeguards 
against threats to international peace and security.”94 The United Nations Organization 
(UN) is the institution created by the powers after World War II and, despite the fact that 
it shared similar characteristics with its predecessor, the League of Nations, it was also 
designed to accomplish a broader and more complex set of missions, which included a 
range of economic and social functions. 
Despite the fact that the UN was often blocked by the decision making system in 
the Security Council, it was capable of creating a set of values that avoided at least some 
conflicts between the two ideological and political blocs. As William J. Durch states, 
The Cold War kept the United Nations to the margin of global security, 
yet, over the decades, it helped to keep the margins from unraveling. UN 
peace observers attended the birth of Israel in 1948, for example, and 
armed peacekeepers still referee the Golan Heights, positioned between 
Syrian and Israeli forces. Elsewhere, UN peacekeepers helped to keep East 
and West from direct military confrontation, serving the West’s interests 
in political-military stability.95  
During this period, the UN conducted operations which are now referred to by 
some scholars traditional peacekeeping missions, or first generation peacekeeping by  
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others, which limited the international involvement to “interposition a force after a truce 
has been reached”96 and is designed to “creating space for negotiation of the underlying 
dispute.”97 
The end of the last war in the so-called “Short Century,”98 the Cold War, brought 
changes in the international arena and, subsequently in the understanding of the 
international community’s role in maintaining peace. In the late 1980s, “a number of 
conflicts that [the Cold War] helped to sustain came to an end.”99 The end of the East-
West confrontation, that often blocked the decisions made by the UN Security Council, 
created conditions for the international community to be more effective in mounting 
successful operations in areas that continued to be in a situation of interstate or intrastate 
conflict. 
But the conditions created at the beginning of the 1990s had another effect: the 
increasing role of international institutions.  
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the end of another war – the 
Cold War – is ushering in a new era for international organizations. The 
decline of the East-West tensions led to a greater cooperation between 
superpowers, often in the context of international organizations. … In the 
large part, this was possible because tensions between the superpowers 
neither escalated hostilities nor paralyzed concerted action by the Security 
Council.”100  
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But the United Nation stopped being the only organization strongly involved in 
the processes of imposing or maintaining international peace.  
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, in their book Leashing 
the Dogs of War, recognize the dramatic change in understanding not only the UN role in 
the management of the peace, but the role of other organizations. They wrote that  
During the 1990s, great powers and international organizations such as the 
United Nations also began to play a much greater role in conflict 
management processes, including the mediation and negotiation of 
international disputes. The same is true of regional and subregional 
organizations, which also began to expand their roles in conflict 
management, sometimes with the support and backing of the international 
community. At the same time, a wide variety of small-state and nonstate 
actors also offered their services in conflict management and resolution 
processes with positive effect.“101 
B. UNPROFOR IN CROATIA 
In 1991, the war in the former Yugoslavia began with the Slovenian and Croatian 
declarations of independence from the Yugoslav federation. The “rising tide of 
nationalism, socioeconomic decline and the near complete paralysis of the federal 
institutions swept the old Yugoslavia toward the abyss.”102 After the outbreak of the 
hostilities, the international community used the diplomacy in its attempts to stop the 
conflict and return the region to the status it had before 1990. These attempts were not 
successful and the UN, as the international institution dedicated to preserving peace and 
security, decided, in June 1991, to deploy a force in Croatia, United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR), that had the mission to create conditions for the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav army from Croatia, to provide the security of so called United Nations 
Protected Areas and to provide appropriate support to humanitarian organizations 
operating in these areas. This force evolved in the next years by extending its area of 
                                                 
101 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, “Introduction” in Leashing the Dogs of 
War, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall eds., (Washington, United States Institute 
for Peace, 2007), 6. 
102 William J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faulttlines: UN Operations in Former Yugoslavia,” in UN 
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil wars of the 1990s, ed. William  J. Durch, (New York, St. 
Martins Press, 1996), 193. 
 44
responsibility to almost the entire territory of the Former Yugoslav Federation and by 
enlarging its mandate from a very limited one at the beginning, “to create the conditions 
of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav 
crisis,”103 to a Chapter VII mission type mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
protecting the safe areas and the need for air support in order to accomplish this mission.   
Four years after its creation, UNPROFOR became a  
massive commitment of the United Nations, … Two of every three blue-
helmeted peacekeepers that the United Nation fielded globally were 
located there, escorting relief convoys, monitoring cease-fires, patrolling 
buffer zones, repairing roads and bridges, and performing a multitude of 
other tasks, often at very high risks, But UN operations were pulled in 
competing directions by difficult and, at times, inconsistent mandates. 
Some tasks were performed well, eve heroically, but in other areas UN’s 
performance was even at best, its mandates a substitute for stronger armed 
intervention that United States and its allies were reluctant to 
undertake.”104 
UNPROFOR’s initial set of tasks in Croatia were set by the UNSCR 743, which 
was based on the plan negotiated by Cyrus Vance, the personal envoy of the UN 
Secretary General for Yugoslavia. During the first two years of deployment, the Vance 
Plan provided the most important guidelines for the military forces involved in this 
operation. Generally speaking, the first phase of the UNPROFOR operations in Croatia 
were mainly focused on the security pillar of the stabilization efforts. The Vance Plan 
saw the resolution of the conflict in Croatia as the result of the “extraction of JNA 
[Yugoslav National Army] from Croatian territory and the establishment of several 
zones, known as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs).”105 These tasks were 
supposed to be accomplished in a non-hostile environment, in which cooperation of the 
actors in the conflict was required. According to these tasks, the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) were derived from the normal UN peacekeeping rules, limiting the rights of UN 
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personnel to use the force in self-defense, as the first priority, to resist attempts to prevent 
UNPROFOR from accomplishing its missions and to counter the military incursions into 
the UNPAs. These rights were more limited by the provisions related to the necessity to 
warn verbally and by warning shots for the proximal use of force.  
In an analysis of the UNPROFOR ROE, published in 1994 in ORBIS, Bruce D. 
Berkowitz states that  
… the underlying problem is that the ROE, which might work in a true 
peacekeeping operation, are being used in a situation in which there is no 
peace. The U.N. forces are expected to operate in the countryside, 
securing safe areas, protecting civilians, and monitoring the opposing 
forces (see the section on "Cordon and Search Operations"). Yet, the ROE 
do not allow the forces the means to carry out such operations effectively 
or at an acceptable level of risk.”106  
The structure of UNPROFOR was also a reflection of the will of the civilian 
decision makers in the UN Security Council to control the operation in detail. Paul F. 
Diehl, analyzing the UNPROFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia in his book 
International Peacekeeping, states that  
… the special representative of the Secretary General has been given a 
decision making role beyond what has been accorded UN personnel in the 
past. Before United Nations has taken action, even simple action such as 
returning fire, approval from UN Representative as well as some of the 
major states has been required.”107  
In terms of civil-military relations, by giving this decision-making power to the 
civilian leadership of the mission, the UN planners sacrificed the efficiency of the 
mission in order to maintain maximum civilian control over the military forces involved 
in UNPROFOR. But, this principle, correct by itself, was undermined by the fact that 
the command structure of the mission was affected by the will of UN decision-makers 
to keep the effort of the mission divided both geographically and organizationally.  
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The UNPROFOR command and control structure, presented in Figure 1, lacked 
unity of effort because it did not encourage the cooperation among the elements of the 
force and made the process of decision making difficult in fields that required 
coordination. The existence of five separate chains of command (military forces, 
administration, civil affairs, civil police and military observers), partly military and 
partly civilian, created an environment in which the relations between the members of 
the force were impeded. William Durch, analyzing the subject, states that  
… from the start, UNPROFOR’s command structure did not promote 
unity of effort. In addition to serving as chief political adviser, the Director 
of Civil Affairs (DCA) directed the civil police monitors. The operation’s 
chief administrative officer (CAO) controlled the purse strings and 
reported directly to New York, in a traditional UN arrangement. Finally, 
the chief military observer (CMO) commanded the mission’s several 
hundred unarmed UNMO. The DCA, CAO and CMO had personnel in 
each of the military sectors who reported directly to them and were not 
organizationally responsive to the military sector commanders.”108 
The efforts of UNPROFOR in Croatia were initially directed towards the 
protection of the UNPAs and demilitarization/disarmament tasks, based on the Vance 
Plan. There were little successes in this task, because of the fact that both the Yugoslav 
Army and Croatian forces (JNA) did not withdraw from UNPAs and did not respect the 
buffer zone agreed under the international mediation process. The most difficult part, 
and, the most important factor in the UN plan, was the demilitarization of the militias 
created by the two factions. And, lacking the means to enforce this task, it was 
unsuccessful. As William Durch observes, “the Vance Plan, moreover, gave 
UNPROFOR no license to implement agreed provisions by force, and in all likelihood 
the parties would not have accepted a de facto intervention force whose guns might at 
some point be turned on them.”109  
And, because of this, but also because of the organizational/institutional problems 
of the mission, the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia had an unintended effect: by 
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pressing on JNA to end the support of Croatian Serbs, it pushed the situation to go off 
balance and gave the Croatian forces an important advantage. Not supported, the krjina 
Serbs did not have any other choice than capitulate and try to gain the maximum from 
this unbalanced situation. 
 
Figure 2.   UNPROFOR – Croatia command relationship110 
 
The UNPROFOR presence in Croatia, despite the successes in protecting 
minorities from violence and in humanitarian issues, by the unbalanced situation that 
resulted from accomplishing its mission gave to Croatian forces important advantages. As 
Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis wrote, “while peacebuilding offers the opportunity 
                                                 
110 The UNPROFOR structure is depicted in several books, having as primary source the UN 
Secretary General Report related to the implementation of the UNSCR 743. The current was published in 
William  J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in Former Yugoslavia,” in UN 
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil wars of the 1990s, ed. William  J. Durch, (New York, St. 
Martins Press), 214. 
 48
for once-warring sides to live together, it does not make them like each other.”111 
UNPROFOR did exactly this, and the unintended consequences, the fact that it created an 
unbalanced situation in Eastern Croatia, “it was only a matter of time before Zagreb 
would try to settle the matter by force.”112 
C. UNPROFOR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Despite the fact that the initial mandate of UNPROFOR was limited to Croatia, 
the presence of this United Nations force in Bosnia-Herzegovina dated from the 
beginning of its deployment. In the initial phases of the mission, the headquarters of 
UNPROFOR were located in Sarajevo, and, because the situation in the region had 
deteriorated, in April 1992 the UN Security Council decided to deploy 100 military 
observers in certain parts of Bosnia. Because of the rapid development of the conflict 
between Bosnian Croats and Muslims on one side and Bosnian Serbs on the other, both 
the UNPROFOR headquarters and the observers were redeployed back in Croatia in the 
UNPAs, leaving in the area 100 personnel to promote local cease-fires and support 
humanitarian activities in Sarajevo. But the efforts of the UN personnel had no results 
and, through a series of Resolutions (769 to 776/1992), the UN Security Council 
expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR “to support the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”113  
This extension of the UNPROFOR mandate and increase in numbers was made in 
circumstances that were not usual for UN forces. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambanis considered that “Bosnia presented a difficult peacebuilding ecology with high 
levels of hostility: an ethnic war with high numbers of death and displacements.”114 
Characterizing the environment in Bosnia, Marcus Cox considered that  
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…intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place in an environment of 
substantial State collapse. At the point when the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina gained widespread international recognition as an 
independent State, it lacked the objective features of Statehood. The 
central government had become essentially a Bosnia regime with some 
intermittent Croat involvement, and controlled barely 30 percent of the 
territory.”115  
The mandate given to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina differed 
dramatically from the one it had in Croatia. In UNSCR 770,  
… the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
called on States to take nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with the 
United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and 
wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”116  
The fact that Chapter VII is mentioned in the mandate creates a new ground for 
UN interventions, because it was deployed in a country torn by ethnic war, with no 
boundaries among factions and no local authorities to provide for the local population. 
The invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, an authorization that was denied during 
the Cold War, is normally given “when peacekeeping missions have experienced 
difficulties (notably UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia), [and these] mandates have been 
revised … to emphasize the right to self-defense … It has tended to represent a rhetorical 
escalation in lieu of greater material or political support.”117 
The UN intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen by many authors as 
inappropriate either because of the mandate given, such as Durch and Schear, who 
consider that it was deployed “nor to monitor cease-fire (as in Croatia), nor to impose 
peace, but to keep the population alive while the war – and diplomatic efforts to end it – 
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continued,”118 or because they considered that “the Security Council sent UNPROFOR, a 
peacekeeping force, into a war situation because not-so-united nations that made up the 
Council were unwilling to contemplate the drastic alternatives available,”119 as Doyle 
and Sambanis write. The lack of a clear mandate and the limitation imposed on the 
UNPROFOR forced the commanders to make difficult decisions regarding the 
capabilities of the force. The force composition was clearly limited by both the UN 
decision and by the lack of international support for the operation. The fact that the UN 
Secretary General requested a force strength of 35,000 troops, and the Security Council 
approved only 7,500 led some commanders to make difficult decision in order to 
substitute the weakness in number with equipment. According to the first UNPROFOR 
commander, Maj. Gen Lewis MacKenzie, in order to provide more firepower for 
peacekeepers, he was  
… working around the UN bureaucracy and dealing with his own 
government: ‘The UN never did authorize us to bring the missiles for the 
TOW [antitank weapon]. We were authorized to bring the vehicle [it was 
mounted on]. In the end, we cheated and brought the missiles anyway. 
Can you imagine telling soldiers to bring the weapon but not the 
ammunition? We were also told we could bring mortars, but not high-
explosive ammunition—only illuminating rounds to help us see at night. 
We ignored that order also.’ “120 
The unclear mandate, the lack of any consent of the parties to allow the 
humanitarian aid to flow, and the difference between the mandate given and the 
capabilities of the forces made UNPROFOR, as time passed, not a solution to the 
problem but a part of it. There was no place for UNPROFOR to occupy, because there 
were no clear parties of the conflict. More over, UNPROFOR was simultaneously in 
Croatia at that time, and the Bosnian conflict had close links with the Croatian one. And, 
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“it was inevitable that UNPROFOR would find itself entangled in the Bosnian war.”121 
Samuel Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
wrote: “… in Croatia the Croatian government and Croats fought the Croatian Serbs, and 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Bosnian government fought the Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Croats, who also fought each other.”122 
The accomplishment of the UNPROFOR missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
became more and more challenging, because of the numerous threats posed by all parties 
to UN convoys and observation posts, both on ground and from air. This led the UN 
Security Council to escalate the mission, banning all flights in Bosnian air space, except 
those in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance. But 
UNPROFOR did not have any capability to enforce this task, except the observation and 
inspection of airfields in Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bosnia. In order to make the UN forces 
capable of accomplishing this new task, UNSC approved by Resolution 786 (1992) 
“expansion of UNPROFOR's strength by 75 military observers to enable it to monitor 
airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro).”123 By the same resolution, the Council asked member states 
to provide technical assistance in the efforts of monitoring the no-fly-zone over Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. This request recalled the lessons learned from the Gulf War in 1991, 
when the intensive use of air power led the coalition to a decisive victory. Despite these 
previous successful use of force in UN mandated missions, “the majority view amongst 
senior military officers in three of the most influential NATO nations—the United States, 
Britain, and France—was one of deep skepticism about the prospects for using airpower 
to quell the violence in Bosnia.”124 But this skepticism was strongly opposed by the 
NATO Secretary General, Dr. Manfred Worner. In 1992-1993,  
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Worner made clear his view that NATO should take a more active stance 
toward the atrocities in Bosnia. In reviewing his public addresses in 1993, 
it is striking how forcefully he called for the NATO action while 
recognizing the deep divisions in the alliance at the time. Worner wanted 
NATO to accept new roles in transatlantic security after the Cold War.”125  
Despite these national concerns about involving NATO in the Balkans, NATO air 
power started to be added to UNPROFOR, creating a unique situation: a military alliance, 
that was yet perceived as a result of the Cold War and it was focused on conventional 
war, supporting a UN operation in proximity of NATO territory. At the beginning, 
NATO supported UNPROFOR deploying its AWACS aircrafts and providing 
information to UN observers about the air situation over Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
But the situation changed in March 1993, when three aircrafts dropped bombs on 
two villages east of Srebrenica, and both NATO and the United States decided that they 
should respond to the UN Security Council request for air support of UNPROFOR. After 
a couple of weeks of discussions in NATO, “Dr. Manfred Worner, informed him [the UN 
Secretary General] that the North Atlantic Council had adopted the ‘necessary 
arrangements’ to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights and that it was 
prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on 12 April 1993.”126 
This decision marked a very important change in the understanding of peace 
operations. NATO, a military alliance with an enormous military power, involved in a 
peace operation conducted by the UN, and that required more than a political decision. 
NATO, a fifty year old military alliance, having its doctrine and equipment targeted 
toward warfare, had to cooperate with an organization in which the use of force was 
drastically limited by norms and rules. The peacekeeping itself, with also a fifty-year 
history, had developed in a completely different direction, of limited use of force, 
legitimacy and neutrality/impartiality. But the situation in Bosnia, as mentioned earlier, 
put the UN forces in a completely different situation: UNPROFOR became part of the 
problem, not a solution to it.  
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In support of UNPROFOR, NATO planned Operations Deny Flight and 
Deliberate Force, operations that had unique characteristics for NATO at that time. The 
operations could have been characterized as an Operation Other than War (OOTW), they 
were out-of-area operations, formally prohibited under the Washington Treaty. At least 
officially, conditions were either not according to NATO doctrine, (in fact, at that 
moment NATO did not have a doctrine for OOTW) or they were politically not 
acceptable. But the personality of the NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner, his 
commitment “to garner support for NATO’s relevance in Bosnia at this time”127 and his 
views about the new role of NATO in the post-Cold War environment made the national 
leaders agree, a fact that opened a new phase in the history of NATO.  
The NATO support for UNPROFOR was, for the first time, when it was 
mentioned in the UN Security Council Resolution covered under a general statement: 
“member-states, acting nationally or through regional organizations may take . . . all 
necessary measures, through the use of air power . . . to support the force in the 
performance of its mandate.”128 This statement did not directly mandate NATO, and, 
additionally, imposed limitations on the effective use of NATO air power through the 
following conditions: ‘‘subject to close coordination with the Secretary General and the 
Force’’129 and ‘‘in the performance of [UNPROFOR] mandate set out in paragraphs 5 
and 9 above.’’130  
Resolutions 836 and 844, both dealing with the support of UNPROFOR by 
NATO, first created misunderstandings for UNPROFOR commanders. Michael C. 
Williams, a former director of information, writing about the UN’s civil-military 
relations, states that UNPROFOR commanders, Generals Morillon and Wahlgren had 
little idea how to proceed with the implementation of the safe areas resolutions. Second, 
the cooperation required a system of coordination, in which both NATO commanders and  
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UN commanders be able to intervene in deciding the use of NATO air power both as a 
means of avoiding “blue-on-blue fire” and to ensure maximum effectiveness of this 
procedure.  
But the NATO support would face other challenges. The lack of military 
decision-makers in the UN would make this cooperation more difficult. The decision 
making powers granted to military commanders in NATO, was not given to UNPROFOR 
military commanders, but to civilian UN representatives, and this situation made the 
cooperation very difficult. The lack of military decision making in the UN institutional 
organizations, the reluctance of UN representatives to use lethal force and, as this thesis 
argues, the lack of understanding of civil-military relations in the UN brought many 
problems into the process of cooperation between these two organizations. 
In order to solve the institutional dilemma of NATO as a supporting force, to use 
force and UNPROFOR, the supported force, to request the use of force and to control the 
delivery of the force to the position and time necessary, caused NATO and UN 
commanders clash over control of the operation. It was a clear difference in the 
understanding of civil-military relations and the delegation of authority in the two 
organizations. In NATO, “the procedures for air-to-ground missions stipulated that 
ordnance could be expended over Bosnia only with clearance from one of five senior 
NATO commanders, with… the CAOC director being the lowest level of approval 
authority.”131 In the UN, the control of the use of force was even tighter, being in the 
hands of the civilian leadership, not UNPROFOR commanders. Bucknam states that “on 
the UN side, air support was also tightly controlled, but at such a high level that it was 
useless to UNPROFOR commanders. Only Boutros Boutros-Ghali could approve an air 
attack.”132 Interviewed by Bucknam, one of the UNPROFOR commanders mentions that 
in the most favorable circumstances, before having the release [approval for an attack], “I 
needed four to six hours. And we had aircraft in the sky permanently. And I said to 
                                                 
131 Mark A. Bucknam, Responsibility of Command: How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced 
Airpower over Bosnia,(Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2003), 94. 
132 Ibid., 95 
 55
General Cot: ‘But, it’s impossible. We have the aircraft above our heads, and I must wait 
six hours to have the release to . . . engage one tank, or two tanks.’ ”133   
In spite of the fact that the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stated that he had 
delegated the authority to his High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this did 
not solve the problem, because enough though Mr. Yasushi Akashi had the opportunity to 
make faster decisions, the decision making procedures did not change significantly. As 
Lt. Col. Bradley S. Davis states in Deliberate Force, Planning Considerations, 
even with Akashi’s newly delegated authority, delays still occurred. For 
example, in March 1994, a request to attack a 40-millimeter gun firing on 
UN forces in the Bihac area took over six hours for approval. Ironically, 
two AC-130 gunships over the area had the offending gun in their sights, 
but by the time they received clearance, the gun had moved back under 
camouflage and escaped.”134  
The conflicting relations among the UNPROFOR commanders and the political 
leaders created dysfunctional civil-military relations in the UN, making both sides react. 
The UNPROFOR commander publicly complained about these problems with the 
decision-making procedures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in response, the UN 
officials, including Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, requested the replacement of the 
commander. 
This continuous struggle between the civilian leadership in UN Headquarters in 
New York and in the theatre of operation continued during the entire operation and this 
situation made the international community to see this UN operation as unsuccessful. The 
perception of UNPROFOR success and, in general, the UN efforts for peace, is stated 
clearly by Mark Duffield in his interview made by Joe Stork, in which he stated that 
“there is a danger of just using humanitarian aid – Bosnia is the classic case of this – as a 
smoke screen to hide political failure. (emphasis added)”135 
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D. CONCLUSION 
UNPROFOR, by the time it was planned and conducted, was a reflection of the 
changing security environment after the end of the Cold War. The UN peacekeeping 
model used during the past fifty years was based on the consent of the parties in inter-
state conflicts. The UN bureaucracy working in the peacekeeping domain had the mind-
set of the observer missions carried out by the blue helmets around the world that were, 
mostly, based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in relatively non-hostile environments 
and with the consent of the parties.  
The UNPROFOR operation had different parameters that would have needed 
another approach and different type of UN response. The situation in the UN Security 
Council in the early 1990s would have made this possible, but the fact that the great 
powers had different agendas and were not capable of concentrating their efforts on 
solving the Yugoslav crises caused the international response inappropriate, not 
coordinated and, it could be also said, late. The pressures that emerged in the Yugoslav 
Federation in the wake of the end of the Cold War “might have been dissipated by 
concerted international action early on.”136  
The opportunities offered by the post-Cold War situation would have given the 
UN, and explicitly to the Security Council, “a new freedom to launch multi-functional 
peacekeeping operations for largely humanitarian purposes within the boundaries of a 
single country.”137 But this opportunity was not taken.  
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN proved not to be prepared to take 
immediate and forcible action in an environment that would have required this. The 
limited mandate, of a largely humanitarian nature, in an ongoing war put UNPROFOR in 
the situation of not being able to impose a peace process and finally it proved ineffective 
in accomplishing its mandate. One of the important factors that made the military part of 
the international efforts ineffective was the fact that the United Nations did not have a 
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permanent and experienced military structure to manage the situation and the 
management of UNPROFOR was civilian and did not give the military commander the 
freedom of action required in a hostile environment in the field. 
The fact that it was such a big difference between the strength of UNPROFOR 
requested by the force commander and that given to him was the first factor that showed 
the incapacity of UN to handle the situation. But, this could be considered normal, 
because those were the forces made available by the UN member-states, and it can be 
considered that it was not a UN mistake, but rather due to the political unwillingness of 
the decision makers in the international community. That should have been compensated 
by a stronger mandate and additional equipment for the military forces – but it was not. 
Military commanders had made decisions and Gen. MacKenzie needed to cheat and 
ignore the orders coming from the civilian leadership not to bring the ammunition for 
certain types of weapons. 
After the NATO involvement in the conflict, the civil-military problems became 
more complicated. On top of existing difficulties between the field commanders and the 
UN civilian leadership, NATO added a new problem: the lack of experience in 
institutional cooperation between a military alliance, with an experienced chain of 
command and clear procedures of delegation of authority from political leadership to 
military command, and an international institution with, at that moment, very limited 
military expertise and with a mindset of the first generation peacekeeping. Additionally, 
the fact that international organizations and agencies were “also split over such issues as 
the question of impartiality toward the parties … [and] the proper role of UN 
peacekeeping,”138 added factors of difficulty to the management of the operation and 
made inter-institutional civil-military relations more complex. 
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The fact that “the UN has no standing military department and relies on troop-
contributing nations to provide forces to conduct its operations, very little corporate 
memory exists within the institution other than for quite limited missions,” 139 made the 
cooperation very difficult.  
The inability to manage the relations with military commanders shown by the UN 
civilian leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina created un-institutionalized civil-military 
relations that could be considered inefficient. Karen Guttieri, analyzing civil-military 
relations in peacekeeping, considered that the two major intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) engaged, the UN and NATO, were “deeply and publicly at odds over the proper 
military response to the situation in Bosnia in 1994. A ‘dual key’ arrangement that 
provided for UN approval of military action by NATO … From a military perspective, 
the command arrangements were not only untidy, they were unsafe.”140  
The complexity of the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that there 
were differences in understanding the command of a military force and these differences 
jeopardized the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping force. This fact was identified by 
many authors as one of the factors of complexity in the realm of peace operations. Paul F. 
Diehl writes:  
UNPROFOR had command and control problems that have seriously 
hindered the mission. As in most operations, troops in the operation 
remained under national control. Yet added to this layer of command is 
NATO, to which some troop-contributing states belong. Beyond this, the 
United States, within and outside of NATO, has been a key actor. Finally, 
the special representative of the Secretary General has been given a 
decision-making role beyond what has been accorded to UN personnel in 
the past. Before United Nations has taken action, even simple actions such 
as returning fire, approval by the UN representative as well as some of the 
member states or NATO has been required.”141 
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Replacing the words command and control used by Diehl with a more appropriate 
concept, namely civil-military relations, it shows that the relations between the civilian 
leadership, namely the UN representative and his staff, and the commanders on the 
ground in UNPROFOR were an important factor that led to the relative inefficiency of 
the mission.  
The incompatibility of the two institutions, UN and NATO, during their 
cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was mainly caused by the difference in the 
mindsets of its personnel. They were completely different: the UN mindset was 
characterized by the tenets of Cold War peacekeeping, such as limited mandates, inter-
state conflicts, impartiality; the NATO mindset was still dominated by the Cold War war-
fighting, experienced civil-military relations, military hierarchy, concordance between 
missions and force levels and so on.  
This situation concerned both organizations, and was reflected in many actions 
taken by both sides. The UN started to change its organization in order to better 
institutionalize its peacekeeping concept and to adapt it to a more complex situation, 
creating the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), a civil-military body 
able to provide better advice to the civilian leadership. This institution added value to the 
UN efforts to remain an organization designed to maintain peace and security. It also 
understood that in complex and violent situation it could rely on other actors’ actions, 
such as  
… regular national or NATO forces [which] are trained, usually have 
formidable equipment and supporting air and naval forces, and are ready 
to go when a crisis erupt, provided that the situation demands it and 
governments in NATO are willing. UN legitimacy, conferred by a 
decision of the Security Council, can certainly strengthen non-UN peace 
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On the other hand, the NATO political leadership became aware that it could have 
a role in the new security environment and, as a result, it took-over the military pillar of 
the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the implementation of the peace 
accord signed by the Bosnian factions at Dayton. 
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IV. EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 
A. NATO AS THE LEADING ORGANIZATION IN BOSNIA 
By 1995, the two security institutions involved in the Bosnian crisis were working 
in support of each other: NATO air operations were planned in support of UNPROFOR 
ground operations, making them “increasingly difficult to separate,”143 both having the 
same objective – namely to force the belligerent factions to come to an internationally 
mediated peace settlement. The efforts made by the international third party brought the 
parties to accept a coercive compromise144 that was brokered by the international 
community led by the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 
Richard Holbrooke. This process started in September 1995 and led to a series of 
agreements that, first, stopped the fighting, and then brought the factions to the 
negotiation table in United States, at Dayton, Ohio. Here, mediated by UN Department of 
State, the factions signed the General Framework Agreement for peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina along with its eleven annexes, an agreement known as GFAP or Dayton 
Agreement. The document had two important goals, to bring to a sustained end to the 
fighting in Bosnia and to start an almost unprecedented effort of the international 
community, the building of a viable state, with stable and self-sustaining institutions. The 
American approach to negotiating this agreement was a “combination of political 
concessions and military force – what might be called a strategy of coercive diplomacy – 
[that] hastened the conclusion of a settlement.”145  
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The Dayton Agreement covered a wide range of provisions, giving the members 
of the international community a decentralized set of roles in the implementaon plan. The 
document, by its annexes, gave specific roles to different international institutions, 
creating an environment in which, not only the UN, but many organizations were 
involved in implementing the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The United Nations received the roles of supervising the humanitarian aspect of 
the implementation, the United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees being 
responsible for supporting the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the role to 
deploy a International Police Task Force (Annexes 7, 8 and 11 of the Dayton 
Agreement). 
OSCE was also involved, by supervising the next rounds of elections in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and monitoring the human rights issues (Annexes 1B, 3 and 6 of the 
Dayton Agreement). 
Compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP (Annexes 1A and 1B) were 
given to a multinational, UN-authorized military force (IFOR). The Accord clearly states 
that  
NATO may establish such a force, which will operate under the authority 
and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic 
Council ("NAC") through the NATO chain of command. They undertake 
to facilitate its operations. The Parties, therefore, hereby agree and freely 
undertake to fully comply with all obligations set forth in this Annex.”146 
By these provisions, the environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina became multi-
institutional, giving the opportunity to many actors to work for the settlement of peace in 
the Europe’s backyard. But, also, by giving decentralized tasks and goals to different 
organizations, it created a relatively new approach to peace operations by taking the 
military pillar from the UN and giving this responsibility to a different institution, in this 
case NATO. The political control of IFOR was given to the NATO civilian authorities, 
taking the UN out of the civil-military chain of command. 
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This was not the only fundamental change in the politico-military decision 
making system for the implementation of the Dayton Accord provisions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The newly created position of High Representative, who “is not a UN 
Special Representative with UN authority and his political guidance comes from a 
Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which is not a standing 
internationally recognized political organization,”147 created new challenges to both 
political and military structures in accomplishing their tasks. This ad-hoc arrangement 
created three parallel structures having the overall responsibility of implementing the 
provisions of the same agreement, without any coordinating authority above them: the 
military pillar was assigned to NATO, the civilian pillars were coordinated by the High 
Representative and UN as the mandating authority, which did not want to take the lead 
role after the unsuccessful UNPROFOR experience. Because of this loose framework of 
cooperation, the NATO military commander had to create a system of cooperation in 
which to exercise the civil-military relations both vertically, on its chain of command, 
and crossover, with the other institutions, in order to be able to “synchronize the civil-
military implementation of the Peace Agreement.”148 
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Figure 3.   Civil-military Relation in IFOR 
 
 
In order to solve this complicated system of relations, the IFOR Commander 
created an institutionalized framework that made the management of the implementation 
easier, the Joint Military Commission (JMC). According to the Dayton Agreement, the 
participants in the Joint Military Commission meeting were: COMIFOR, who was the 
chairman of the Commission; the High Representative, the parties’ military commanders 
and other organizations as invited by the IFOR Commander. The JMC gave more 
authoritative powers to COMIFOR, because, as chairman, he was empowered to call the 
meeting, to set the agenda and to invite additional parties to every meeting. Moreover, 
according to the Agreement, IFOR Commander made the final decisions on military 
matters.149 
This arrangement was even extended to the entire theater of operations. Using the 
Dayton Accord provisions, the IFOR Commander approved the creation of military 
commissions down to the subordinated military formations. Despite the fact that these 
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were called subordinate military commissions, in reality they were not “sub-commissions 
run by the JMC, as the peace agreement suggests.”150 They were local arrangements 
needed because the High Representative did not have a strong presence in the territory, 
but the presence of many international and non-governmental organizations made the 
creation of these commissions a necessity, giving the possibility to the subordinate 
commanders to establish a similar system of civil-military relations at local level. 
By implementing this comprehensive system, the GFAP brought a new approach 
to the civil-military relations in a UN-mandated peace force: the IFOR Commander 
(COMIFOR) “is the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this agreement 
on the military aspects of the peace settlement, of which the Appendices constitute an 
integral part.”151 By this provision, the COMIFOR was given a “textually coequal 
role”152 with the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking 
out the military commander from a loose institutionalized authority and giving him more 
freedom of action in the relatively hostile environment at the beginning of the 
implementation phase. But the COMIFOR was still under the political control of the 
NATO institutionalized civil-military relations, the North Atlantic Council, and under the 
supervision of the military structure that existed in NATO. In fact, this was a continuation 
of the NATO policy regarding its participation in the international efforts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the previous arrangement, namely supporting UNPROFOR, and it 
continued the traditional civil-military relations in which the civilian leadership “allowed 
the SACEUR great discretion in doing what General Joulwan felt necessary to succeed 
militarily. In this respect, Werner [NATO Secretary General] did not try to micro-manage 
NATO’s military arm and granted the SACEUR operational leeway.”153 
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IFOR operations were authorized by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The NATO-led IFOR’s tasks were both classical peacekeeping roles, such as 
to separate the belligerent armed forces, stabilize the cease-fire, and other types of tasks, 
different from the traditional peacekeeping tasks, namely to support the implementation 
of other roles performed by different elements of the international commitment in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, such as return of refugees, law enforcement, cooperation with the 
international criminal proceedings for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). This was a seen as a critical task, mainly by the international 
community. One IFOR “has stopped the open conflict, the most important contribution 
the international community can make towards promoting an enduring peace is to ensure 
the arrest and surrender to the Tribunal of individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity,”154 as states an International Crisis Group report in November 1996. 
But NATO forces “essentially abdicated its authorized responsibility to apprehend 
indictees”155, some of them being part of the IFOR cooperation arrangements, such as 
Military Commissions at all levels, and apprehending them could jeopardize the process. 
Moreover, IFOR assiduously avoided supporting the International Police Task Force 
(IPTF), the entity that had this task as a first priority.156  
The cooperation between NATO forces and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former Yugoslavia was seen as difficult by various observers of the IFOR mission. 
The American Journal of International Law states that “neither NATO nor any other 
entity acts as an agent or enforcement arm of the ICTY, … [and] actions of NATO are 
not dictated or controlled by the Tribunal,”157 showing that at least that this field of 
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cooperation and this supporting task was left behind by NATO forces, in order to be able 
to successfully implement the other provisions of the Dayton Agreement using the 
maximum cooperation of the belligerent parties. 
The success of the NATO-led IFOR was measured mainly by assessing the 
security tasks, the Peace Implementation Council concluding, at the London conference 
in December 1996, that “welcomes the substantial progress made in the past year. In 
particular: peace has taken root: in 1996, no Bosnian has died in military conflict; 
elections have been held, with the participation of 2.4 million citizens; barriers to 
freedom of movement have begun to be dismantled; the establishment of the new multi-
ethnic common institutions, most recently the setting up of the Council of Ministers, has 
begun; reconstruction is underway.”158 
But NATO and the High Representative had their own initiatives for the 
assessment of success. The operational analysts from IFOR headquarters continually 
studied the progress of NATO operation and the fulfillment of the Dayton Accord tasks 
in order to provide comprehensive advice to both the military commanders and civilian 
leadership. A complete study was published in 2002 by Operations Research and 
Functional Services Division, NATO Consultation Command & Control Agency, that 
reflects the progress made by IFOR in implementing the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The group used a series of indicators, grouped as 
The Basic Needs of the Individual, The Needs of the Community and The Needs of the 
Nation to measure the success of IFOR. The results  
… illustrated in an objective manner some initial statistically significant 
improvements throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina… The greatly 
improved security situation underpinned by the IFOR military presence 
will undoubtedly have been one of the most significant factors 
contributing to the improvements detected by the survey.”159  
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The IFOR commander used the study both externally, to show the strategic and 
regional improvements to the civilian members and political leadership of the mission, 
and internally, as a management tool, to indicate the differences in the recovery or 
regression in different areas of concern in order to manage the use of IFOR resources 
according to the needs on the ground. Also, this study was used as a tool to improve civil-
military relations with the international community interested in the evolution of the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making it available to the non-governmental and 
international organizations which “expressed an interest in future collaboration in data 
gathering and in the sharing of existing data.”160 
The NATO-led IFOR operation opened a new road in planning and conducting 
peace operations by its characteristics, such as involvement of a military alliance, NATO, 
designed for total war, into an operation other than war as the leading organization, the 
fact that the United Nations did not lead the international community commitment and 
the wide participation of both civilian organizations and national armed forces. This fact 
created great challenges for the leadership of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the fist year of commitment, 1996; challenges that were encountered with success by the 
international community.  
An analysis made by the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping 
mentions that IFOR experience  
… helped to avoid problems encountered by UNPROFOR (mainly 
because this was not based on a peace agreement) and to ensure a clear 
definition of military tasks under a unified chain of command… a unified 
command and control has been a major success, building on experience 
from the PfP programme and based on innovative command and control 
arrangements at all levels. Moreover, most nations believe that IFOR’s 
military success derived to a large extent from preformed, proven 
command structures and logistic systems and from long-term contingency 
planning carried out at NATO. ”161 
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Also, Peter Barschdorff, in his article Can NATO Deliver? considers that  
NATO is now prepared to act more flexibly, with forces better 
experienced in peacekeeping, and suitable command and control lines well 
established. The breakup of Yugoslavia was seen as the herald of violent 
ethnic and nationalistic strife all over Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, a 
view that proved to be exaggerated (or, perhaps, a scenario that was 
successfully prevented).”162 
In mid-1996, after the assessment that important objectives of Dayton Accord 
were achieved, among them the fact the dramatic improvement in security and the 
successfully conduct of the September elections, NATO politico-military leadership 
concluded that the Alliance needed to re-assess the continuation of the support provided 
to the international community for the establishment of a secure environment in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. According to the NATO Military Authority study carried out in 1996, 
the Alliance “should organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR). … The role of IFOR was to 
implement the peace. The role of SFOR is to stabilize the peace. The difference between 
the tasks of IFOR and SFOR is reflected in their names.”163 
By UN Security Council Resolution 1088, issued on 12 December 1996, SFOR 
was authorized by the Unite Nations as the legal successor of IFOR, operating under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and using the same robust rules of engagement as the 
previous force. Its mission was to  
… deter hostilities and stabilize the peace, contribute to a secure 
environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of 
Responsibility (AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key areas 
including primary civil implementation organizations, and progress 
towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-
led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”164 
Because the environment was much less hostile, the NATO political authorities 
decided to reduce the strength of SFOR to 32,000 troops and to re-analyze the force 
structure every six month in accordance with the accomplishment of the mission and 
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resources available. As a result of these restructuring steps, SFOR strength was decreased 
by 12,000 in 2003 and continued to be downsized until the end of the mission. The 
command structure of SFOR remained unchanged, under the full authority of the NATO 
politico-military leadership and continuing to exercise the same type of civil-military 
relations. 
Despite the fact that “external actors have not created a coherent administrative 
power”165 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SFOR continued to work closely with the Office 
of High Representative, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UN International 
Police Task Force and its follow-on, European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and OSCE 
in implementing the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord.  
The most important change in the multi-institutional environment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that was made during the SFOR mission was the fact that the European 
Union (EU) extended its involvement in the Balkans, by deploying a “police training and 
advisory mission in Bosnia in the ESDP framework — the EU Police Mission in Bosnia 
[which] currently comprises just over 150 international police personnel, and its mandate 
runs through the end of 2007.”166 Also, the EU decided that it should take over the 
responsibility of the Office of High Representative, a position with limited political 
legitimacy, which was the result of the political compromise at the end of UNPROFOR 
mission and which made possible the take-over of the peace process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by NATO in 1996. The transition would have been a gradual one, from the 
double hatting of the High Representative both to the Peace Implementation Committee 
and to EU, to total evolution of this position into a EU-only office in 2007.167 
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The relations between SFOR and the other actors involved in the peace effort in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved on the same parameters initiated during IFOR 
existence, with NATO as the leading organization and supporting the other actors in 
performing their tasks. 
According to the International Crisis Group Report, in October 1996  
… there have been some successes under the Dayton Peace Agreement: 
the Central Bank, a common currency, common license plates, state 
symbols, and the CAFAO-led Customs reforms. So too, SFOR has 
managed to keep the peace for three and a half years. But the one common 
factor among these successes is that all were forcibly imposed by the 
international community. Outside of the DPA framework, the efforts of 
the World Bank, UNHCR, USAID, the EU, and individual donor nations 
succeeded in reconstructing much of Bosnia’s war-damaged public 
infrastructure. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina has new roads, schools, 
hospitals, bridges, houses, and power lines, and in Sarajevo much of the 
wartime damage has been repaired.”168 
Elizabeth M. Cousens considers that, by mid-2000, the first criterion of 
effectiveness of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, namely consolidation of 
the cease-fire signed in 1995, had been achieved.169 
Also, the impact of IFOR/SFOR was also recognized by Michael W. Doyle and 
Nicholas Sambanis when they analyzed the incident in Brcko, writing “as with 
IFOR/SFOR, the significant number was the usually heavy international investment in 
the supervision of the local police”170 brought the incident to an end. 
Despite these recognized successes, the NATO-led force’s relation with the ICTY 
continued to be tense and the IFOR/SFOR mission to apprehend the indictees was 
considered an area of concern. Officially, the cooperation between SFOR, the Office of 
the High Representative and the Unites States led to an increase of the number of 
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indictees transferred to The Hague for Trial. According to the Report on Progress Made 
Toward Achieving Benchmarks for a Sustainable Peace Process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina presented to the US House of Representatives in June 2003,  
88 Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs) have been transferred to 
The Hague for Trial. Nineteen indicatees remain at large out of a total of 
138 public indictments to date. Acting within its mandate, SFOR has 
intensified its search efforts, assisted in the transfer of indicatees to The 
Hague, and supported ICTY field investigations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.”171 
The international community pressed on this fact and the public opinion was 
aware of the fact that the institutions that had this mission did not solve this important 
issue of reconciliation. In a Report written in November 2000, War Criminals In Bosnia’s 
Republika Srpska, the International Crisis Group depicted the problems that both SFOR, 
the local police and the EU Police Task Force face in accomplishing this provision of the 
Dayton Accord. About the SFOR attitude towards this task, the report states: 
The ICTY regularly forwards both its public and sealed indictments to 
SFOR. Yet war crimes arrests remain relatively few in number, which has 
led to the criticism that SFOR is not living up to its obligations under 
Dayton. When asked to justify the slow pace of arrests, many SFOR 
officers have repeated the mantra “its not part of our mandate.” SFOR 
officials typically state that the local police are responsible for arresting 
war crimes suspects, and that it is not SFOR’s job, ignoring that in the 
case of RS [Republika Srpska], the Serbs—in contrast to the Croats and 
Bosnians—have yet to arrest suspected war criminals. As a result of RS 
refusal to cooperate with the ICTY, to date the majority of SFOR actions 
against war crimes suspects have occurred in RS.172 
Despite the criticism coming from the NGOs, the ICTY continued to consider that  
… day-to-day relationships with international organizations throughout 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia remain essential to the success of 
the Prosecutor’s mandate. SFOR continues to provide valuable support to 
the Office of the Prosecutor in connection with investigation and assists in  
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the execution of search warrants. SFOR maintains the capacity to 
apprehend indictees, though the last operation to arrest a fugitive was 
conducted in July 2002.”173  
The mandate of SFOR ended in December 2004. At the official ceremony 
dedicated to mark the end of the transition from SFOR to EUFOR, NATO Secretary 
General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer characterized the NATO operation as a success, saying 
that “today is truly a day for celebration – for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also for the 
wider international community. People no longer live in fear, state institutions had been 
established and there was respect of human rights.”174 
B. EUFOR – EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN BOSNIA  
The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was started long before with the decisions 
made by the European Union to become an actor in the security environment on the 
international scene. The deployment of the EU Police Task Force in 2003 “laid the 
groundwork for future missions, acting as a test bed for policies and procedures.”175  
The European Union also conducted several smaller peace operations in different 
areas in order to test its capabilities to accomplish these types of missions, such as 
Operation Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Operation 
Artemis, in town of Bunia in the Northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
These operations were considered successes and the EU started to plan its 
operations in the Balkans. In 2004, the NATO and EU planners developed the details 
regarding the distinct EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The discussions between 
the experts in NATO and the EU showed initial controversies regarding the type and 
mandate of a residual NATO presence in the theatre of operations. Initially, NATO 
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planners envisaged a more robust presence of NATO forces, with tasks beyond the 
advisory and support missions that EU decision makers would have accepted. The EU 
officials requested “to maintain full operational control of, and autonomous decision-
making authority over, the military mission.”176 Finally, the NATO and EU officials 
decided that the institutions should cooperate in this mission by giving EUFOR a 
“primary military stabilization role, while the NATO headquarters presence was to focus 
primarily on defense reform. However, both share some operational tasks.”177 
Analyzing the missions that each of the organizations have given to their missions 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, presented in Table 1, it can be observed that they overlap and 
even compete in some areas of responsibility. One of these tasks is defense reform. The 
European Union Office of High Representative (EUOHR) core task in this field is to 
… establish a functioning single defense establishment with initial 
operational capability across the full spectrum of State-level 
responsibilities and commitments in defense matters, as well as a basic 
understanding and skills for interoperable information and planning 
mechanisms according to NATO/PfP standards.178 
The NATO HQ in Sarajevo Defense and Security Sector Reform Cell’s (DSSR) 
mission is to “direct defense reform policy, co-ordination and implementation”179. These 
two tasks are complementary, NATO having a supporting role for EUOHR’s mission. In 
addition to this, OSCE, the third major institution present in this area, is also involved in 
this field, Major General John Drewienkiewicz, Director of the OSCE Department for 
Security Cooperation (DSC) being also Military Adviser to the High Representative and 
the point of contact for this task. 
The other tasks show the complementarity of the work among the security 
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The primary task of EUFOR is to provide 
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deterrence and a safe environment for the other organizations, OSCE, NATO and EU 
OHR cooperating in the transition to a stable secure environment (with the last two 
heavily focused on institution building at the central level and the first one concentrating 
its efforts at the local level). Both NATO and EUFOR are supporting ICTY detention of 




EUFOR EU OHR 
Primary 
mission 
- defense reform  
- deterrence  
- compliance with GFAP 
- safe and secure environment 
- the rule of law 
- reforming the economy 
- institution building 





- support ICTY 
detention of 
PIFWCs;  
- support ICTY detention of 
PIFWCs;  
- provide the security 
environment for police ops. 
Not mentioned in the 
mandate 
Table 1.   Comparative mission and tasks of NATO and EU in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
 
This complex environment, with complementary tasks and competition among the 
institutions involved in a peace operation, created difficulties both for the military 
commanders and the civilian leadership. The multi-institutional environment has been 
reflected into the civil-military relations, creating a more complex situation because of 
the fact that both EU and NATO had military headquarters, military commanders and 




Figure 4.   Civil-military Relation in the multi-institutional environment in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina  
 
The international mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to work towards 
the implementation of the Dayton Accords despite complicated relations that were set up 
among the participant actors. The capability of the European security institutions to work 
together was questioned because of the complexity of the environment, the demanding 
objectives and the legacy of the conflict itself. In his article The OSCE, NATO and EU 
within the “Network of Interlocking Security Institutions: Hierarchization, Flexibility, 
Marginalization, written in 2003, Ingo Peters asked if “the problem of inter-institutional 
cooperation between the European security organizations [has] been solved.”180 He 
concludes that “the preeminence of NATO and EU … in the ‘network of interlocking 
European security institutions’ amount in practice to – at best – a solution to the problem 
of inter-institutional cooperation.”181 
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The fact that the European Union was capable of cooperating with NATO in a 
peace operation was questioned because the European Union did not have a military 
structure to effectively plan and conduct military operations. The use of the Berlin 
Plus182 arrangement gave EU a degree of experience using NATO’s planning capabilities 
and “has increased the EU’s operational experience considerably.”183 But the fact that the 
EU started its cooperation with NATO much earlier gave to the European Union the 
opportunity to learn that a permanent military structure and democratic civil-military 
relations are necessary conditions to succeed.  
The current assessments of the ongoing EUFOR mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are mostly of them related to the complicated system of relations created in 
the last years. One solution was proposed by the International Crisis Group in the report 
Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: a New International Engagement Strategy. The Group 
proposes “the closure of the OHR by the end of 2007 and the transfer of all its 
responsibilities for the Dayton Peace Accords to the European Union, to be exercised 
through its Special Representative”184 and to, 
… provide political advice to the EU Force (EUFOR) Commander and the 
head of mission of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and ensure 
coordination between EUPM and all other actors and monitor and report 
on implementation of the Dayton Accords to all relevant bodies including 
the PIC, the UN Security Council and the EU.”185  
The Group also considers that  
… progress is slow, but it is progress, primarily because NATO will 
remain in Bosnia through the Partnership for Peace Program, NATO 
membership is a credible objective and heretofore the OHR has 
aggressively supported reforms. On the ground the European Union Force 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) may also do more to help Bosnia  
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and Herzegovina make further progress in military reform and towards 
European integration in close cooperation with the EUSR [EU Special 
Representative]”186,  
concluding that the presence of all organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still 
needed, but it should be structured in order to provide more effectiveness of the different 
institutions and of their cooperation. 
C. CONCLUSION 
By analyzing the presence of the European security institutions in the peace 
operations in Balkans, one can assess that the effectiveness of the international 
community in this area increased dramatically compared with the stage when the UN was 
the leading institution in the effort of limiting the armed conflict and bringing the conflict 
to a peaceful resolution.  
NATO, as a military alliance, with experienced strategic and operational planning 
capabilities, with strongly institutionalized civil-military relations, was able to learn from 
the failure of the non-institutionalized cooperation and difficult civil-military relations 
with UN in UNPROFOR. It was able to take-over the entire operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and, with relative effectiveness, implement the provisions of the Dayton 
Agreement. Later on, the NATO leadership was capable of stabilizing the area and 
implementing a system of cooperation with the other institutions and organizations that 
were involved in the area.  
NATO also learned a lot from the IFOR/SFOR experience. Gregory Schulte, the 
head of NATO's Bosnia Task Force wrote that “operations in former Yugoslavia ... gave 
the immediate impetus for NATO's increased emphasis on peacekeeping and 'out-of area' 
operations, as well as for many other aspects of its transformation.”187 The measures 
taken by NATO’s political and military leadership during and after IFOR/SFOR 
operations ranged from the implementation of the Rapid Reaction Forces concept, in 
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order to increase the responsiveness of the military forces in case of crisis, to changes in 
the doctrines, tactics and procedures used in peace operations.  
In June 2004, an International Crisis Group recognized that  
… the NATO-led mission has been the most successful aspect of the 
international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has been widely 
seen as the strongest guarantor that war will not break out again. Its 
departure and replacement by EUFOR reflect the belief prevalent both in 
Brussels and Washington that, on the one hand, the security situation has 
improved profoundly and no longer requires a strong NATO presence, 
and, on the other, that EU military capabilities have grown strong enough 
to take the lead in fixing problems in Europe's backyard.”188 
The EUFOR is the test area for EU capabilities to operate as a credible security 
institution in the international arena. EUFOR operation proved to be effective until now, 
in spite of the complicated relations (both civil-military, military to military and among 
the civilian actors) it inherited from its predecessors. From 2004 until now, EU has 
lacked the backbone to insist that its standards be met, as a former diplomat with long 
Balkan experience told International Crisis Group in an interview in 2007. From now, 
European Union must simplify the complex relations created in the international efforts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and it should become the central and leading organization in 
order to impose its standards and to change the current situation, in which Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a virtual trusteeship of the international community.189 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis has firstly analyzed the civil-military relations in European security 
institutions both in a static way, by looking to their structure and whether there are 
institutional mechanisms to exercise democratic civilian control over the permanent 
military elements of their structure. Secondly, it focused on the peace operations planned 
and conducted by these organizations, in order to identify whether civil-military relations 
had an influence over the performances of these institutions in their commitment to 
preserve the peace and security in their area of interest. 
After analyzing the existing literature on civil-military relations, peace operations 
and concepts such as mutually reinforcing institutions and interlocking institutions in the 
Introduction, Chapter II looked to three European security institutions that have a strong 
military presence in their structure. It asked if these organizations have in their structure 
institutions that determine civil-military relations, institutions identified by the authors of 
the book Who Guards the Guardians and How; Democratic Civil-Military Relations at 
the state level, namely “ministries of defense, legislatures, control of military 
budgets….”190 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a fifty year-old military alliance 
that has a well established and experienced multinational command structure, well 
established civilian components that have the task to make political decisions regarding 
the commitment of its military in operations and provide political guidance which must 
be taken into consideration by the military commanders and staffs during the day-to-day 
activity and during the planning of their operations. 
The European Union is an institution that, for more then fifty years, had little 
involvement in security and military matters. But in the late eighties and early nineties, 
the European powers started to be more and more interested in these issues, with some 
attempts to become an actor in the security field, such as the military structure of WEU 
and the creation of the first common European military structure, EUROCORPS. These 
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initiatives were unsuccessful, but because of the strong institutionalization of the 
European political structure (the creation of the European Commission, European 
Parliament) in the late nineties and the successive crisis in the EU’s area of interest, need 
appeared to add to this structure an institution to deal with the European foreign and 
security policy. The EU created military command structures and institutionalized the 
civil-military relations created by the interference of the political and military bodies in 
its structure.   
The Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe is a regional security 
institution especially designed to participate in peace operations. Its structure is analyzed 
in order to complete the spectrum of security institutions in this thesis with an 
organization that was purposely created to be an actor in the European security 
environment and it is another example of institutionalized civil-military relations in 
multinational organizations. 
The findings of Chapter II show that all three organizations present clear 
institutional mechanisms of democratic civil-military relations. They have political 
structures to exercise democratic civilian control over the military establishments created 
inside them and they have mechanisms that assess their military effectiveness. But these 
mechanisms lack the oversight functions of the civilian decision-making bodies, such as 
the national parliaments at state level. As Heiner Hänggi states,  
… except for the EU, all relevant international institutions are of a purely 
intergovernmental character. … Even the role of the European Parliament, 
which has few powers, but considerable resources and a strong political 
will to exercise parliamentary accountability, is at best marginal when it 
comes to foreign and security affairs.”191 
The next chapters focus on how the international community involved in a crisis 
area, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, in two different case-studies: firstly, the UN as a 
leading organization requesting support from NATO forces, in a loose cooperation 
environment, and secondly, when European security institutions (NATO and 
subsequently, EU) took the lead and applied their strategies, doctrines and civil-military 
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relations. The initial involvement of the UN forces led to escalation of the conflict rather 
then limiting it because the UN mission was unable to manage the complex environment 
created by the NATO involvement in supporting the UN Operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). Neither UN nor NATO was prepared at that time to 
effectively cooperate in such a complex situation. When NATO and, latter, the European 
Union took over the mission, they used the experience gained during the UN involvement 
and were able to improve the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European 
security institutions therefore proved they were able to learn both from the experience 
they had in a loose cooperation with the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and apply this 
experience in a more complex environment when they took the lead of the missions in the 
Balkans. 
Chapter III is focused on the international security institutions and their 
cooperation during the beginning of the Bosnian crisis, by analyzing the United Nations 
mission deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR, and the cooperation between 
the UN force and the NATO operation designed to support it. There is extensive literature 
that considers this UN mission a failure. And many scholars consider that one of the most 
important reasons for this is the fact that the UN and its political structures were not able, 
at the moment they drafted the UNPROFOR mission, to understand that contemporary 
“conflict is not only political but also multinational, multiorganizational, 
multidimensional, and multicultural.”192 The mandate given to UNPROFOR, the rules of 
engagement imposed on it, did not conform to the situation on the ground, the 
environment in which this force was deployed being more hostile than the civilian 
decision-makers in New York assessed. The UN civilian policy-makers should have 
adjusted their “mind-set [to] allow leaders to be comfortable with political ambiguity and 
at ease as part of a synergistic process”193 of a multi-institutional operation.  
And this factor was aggravated when the UN requested NATO support for its 
actions, because the organizations were not ready to cooperate, each having different 
mind-sets: the UN concept was based on traditional inter-state peacekeeping extensively 
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used during the Cold War and NATO doctrine of the total war remained predominant. 
Additionally, in UN forces, the strategic level military planning was missing and the 
decision-making was pushed up the chain of command, without any way to delegate the 
authority to use force down to military commanders, so the civilian leadership micro-
managed the use of force on the ground, a concept considered by many scholars 
inefficient from the civil-military relations point of view. This situation dramatically 
differed from the NATO understanding of use of force, NATO having clear provisions in 
its doctrines related to the delegation of authority to the ground commanders. 
Chapter IV focuses on the NATO and, subsequently, EU, missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It analyzes the application of the civil-military relations of these 
organizations in a peacekeeping environment and the influence of their established 
institutionalized civil-military relations over the process of implementation and 
stabilization of the situation in the area.   
The NATO missions, IFOR and SFOR, were characterized by the creation of a 
complicated, but effective structure of civil-military relations, by taking out the military 
commander from the loose institutional framework of the UN and keeping him 
accountable to the well established NATO politico-military structure. The UN function in 
the mission remained limited to the role of mandating authority, with no involvement in 
the conduct of military operations and with limited involvement in the civilian 
implementation of the Dayton Accord provisions, by its different agencies, such as 
UNHCR and Food and Agriculture Organization. More than that, the civilian 
implementer, the Office of High Representative, another traditional role of the UN, was 
given to an ad-hoc group, the Peace Implementation Committee, which had no authority 
over the military commanders, but with which the NATO military forces interfered by 
what were called in this thesis crossover military relations. 
The involvement of the European Union in the international effort in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, by taking over the civilian police mission from the UN, brought more 
complexity to the environment of interlocking institutions at work in the Balkans.  
The effectiveness of IFOR and SFOR was analyzed both by the academic 
environment and the international community. The civilian authority “responsible for 
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overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord ending the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”194 considered, after only one year of NATO direct involvement, that 
progress had been made in the implementation of security measures, the spectrum of 
missions that NATO was given. Among others, Elizabeth M. Cousens, in Ending Civil 
Wars – The Implementation of Peace Agreement and Stephen D. Krasner in Chapter 36, 
Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing states in Unleashing the 
Dogs of War, recognize that despite the fact that civilian implementation was slower, the 
security in Bosnia and Herzegovina improved with the deployment of NATO forces. 
Many scholars argue that the NATO forces had clear mandates, strict and strong rules of 
engagement, issued by the experienced institutions. The reasons why the NATO civilian 
decision-making bodies were able to issue such guidance and missions are twofold: first, 
the NATO bureaucracy had the experience of producing such documents in which the 
clarity and brevity of military documents were important characteristics and, second, the 
civilian leadership had the military advisory apparatus in order to accept and use the 
military advice given by experienced military headquarters. Exactly the characteristics 
that the UN did not have when they started the UNPROFOR mission. 
The European Union, the organization that took over the mission from NATO in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, had created a structure of institutions, similar to the 
NATO structure, to deal with the challenges posed by the involvement of military forces 
in a peace operation, the complex environment in peacekeeping and a “situation [that] 
requires the greatest civil-military and military-military diplomacy, cooperation, and 
coordination.”195  
The effectiveness of the regional security institution commitment in the Balkans 
is currently measured by the dramatic decrease of violence. This development is shown 
by the fact that the number of troops needed to provide security decreased from 60,000 in 
1996, when IFOR was deployed, to the planned 2,500 at the end of 2007, according to the 
EUFOR website.  
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As this thesis argues, one of the factors that influenced this improvement after 
NATO took over the mission is that IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR received clear missions and 
comprehensive political guidance from their political decision-making bodies and the 
civilian structures did not interfere with the micro-management of the conduct of 
operations.  
Despite the fact that the security was improved, the international community is 
still circumspect related to the future of a stable and peaceful Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Security is only one pillar of the international efforts to stabilize areas of conflict, and 
scholars still question if the other actions to improve the situation in other areas, such as 
the state and governance, the economic and social well being and the justice and 
reconciliation, will have the same success.196 As Stephen D. Krasner writes, the danger 
for these kinds of international commitments is the fact that they can become, in time, 
virtual trusteeships of the international organizations.197 
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